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Abstract
This article examines potential civil liability under the multistate norms of tort and closely related areas in the common law
of the United States for the mass media re-publisherof leaked corporate secrets. The examination employs two fact patterns derived
from real cases: one, contemporary, an international bank's
grievance, never resolved on the merits in court, against the online
publisher WikiLeaks; and second, conventional, a tobacco manufacturer's grievance,feared but never filed, against the television
newsmagazine 60 Minutes. The study assumes jurisdiction arguendo and examines liability theories in tortious interference;
unfair-competition law; and conversion, trade-secret appropriation, and related theories of theft. The Article concludes that direct liability under any of these theories is unlikely, but that claims
for associativeliability might well succeed. In reaching these conclusions, the study analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the
claims and the vulnerabilities of the defenses, including the freedom of speech. Ultimately, the Article demonstrateshow nuanced
questions offact would prove dispositive of liability, such that the
liability exposure of the media defendant increases in proportion
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to its entanglement with an unscrupulous source. The discernible
risk of liability counsels against an absolutist stance on the freedom of information when media contemplate the republication of
leaked corporatesecrets.
The beginning of strife is as when one letteth out water: therefore
leave off contention, before it be meddled with.
-Proverbs 17:14 (King James Bible, Cambridge ed.)
1. RE-PUBLISHING CORPORATE SECRETS
A. Introduction
Neither governments nor corporations care to see their secrets published online. Both expend resources to keep files under
wraps, whether the government in protecting its national security
plans or the corporation in protecting its proprietary product formulae. And both secret-keepers have long enjoyed resort to domestic courts to enjoin or punish unwanted revelations.'
The global reach of the Internet has thrown a wrench in the
works for these information owners. 2 The Internet brought global
publication within reach of the ordinary person with a laptop, regardless of originating locale. Secrets can be leaked more easily
and quickly than in conventional media, and genies out of the bottle are difficult to recapture.3

1.
CEO

Cf Transcriptof Secret Meeting Between Julian Assange and Google
Eric

Schmidt,

WIKILEAKS

(Apr.

19,

2013),

http://www.wikileaks.org/Transcript-Meeting-Assange-Schmidt.html ("There is
one difference about the deployment of coercive force but even there we see that
well connected corporations are able to tap into the governmental system and the
court system and are able to deploy ... effectively deploy coercive force, by
sending police to do debt requisition or kicking employees out of the office."
(alteration in original)).
2.
E.g., Pamela Samuelson, Principlesfor Resolving Conflicts Between
Trade Secrets and the FirstAmendment, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 777, 796-99 (2007)
(discussing vulnerability of trade secrets to Internet innovations).
3. Cf Richard J. Peltz, Fifteen Minutes of Infamy: PrivilegedReporting
and the Problem of Perpetual Reputational Harm, 34 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 717,
743-45 (2008) (describing Internet properties of accessibility, longevity, and
dynamism).
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The law has been slow to catch up. Today, worldwide publishers manage to evade the jurisdiction of domestic courts,4 sometimes by escaping the reach of personal jurisdiction to initiate a
cause of action,s and sometimes by placing technology beyond the
reach of interlocutory and remedial court orders. 6 Much of the
difficulty in online enforcement has arisen from international political disagreement over appropriate jurisdictional and freeexpression norms where online publishing is concerned. These
disagreements do persist. Fretting over the phenomenon of "libel
tourism," by which defamation plaintiffs forum-shop among nations for weak free-expression defenses,8 the United States recently
adopted legislation at the national level to block the enforcement of
foreign defamation judgments.9 Iceland unveiled an ambitious

4. See, e.g., Jonathan Stray, IcelandAims to Become an Offshore Haven
for Journalists and Leakers, NIEMAN JOURNALISM LAB (Feb. 11, 2010, 9:00
AM), http://www.niemanlab.org/2010/02/iceland-aims-to-become-an-offshorehaven-for-journalists-and-leakers/ (reporting proposals in Icelandic parliament
to create haven for whistleblowing through combination of source protection,
free speech, and libel-tourism prevention laws).
5.
See, e.g., Developments in the Law - The Law of Media, 120 HARV.
L. REV. 1031, 1032-33 (2007) (comparing case law from United States and
Commonwealth countries concerning jurisdiction over online-media defendants).
6. See, e.g., Adam Liptak & Brad Stone, Judge Shuts Down Web Site
Specializing
in
Leaks,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Feb.
20,
2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/20/us/20wiki.html? r-0 ("The feebleness of
the [injunction granted to plaintiff bank] suggests that the bank, and the judge,
did not understand how the domain system works, or how quickly Web communities will move to counter actions they see as hostile to free speech online.").
7.
See, e.g., Libel Tourism: Hearing on H.R. 6146 Before the Subcomm.
on Commercialand Admin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
20 (2009) (statement of Bruce D. Brown, Partner, Baker Hostetler LLP) (positing threat to free speech in U.S. recognition of foreign defamation judgments).
8.
E.g., Steven M. Richman, John F. Stephens, & Mark E. Wojcik, Remarks at Libel Tourism in the Internet, Continuing Legal Education Program at
the Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association (Aug. 9, 2013).
9.
Securing the Protection of our Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage (SPEECH) Act, Pub. L. No. 111-223, 124 Stat. 2380 (2010)
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4105 (2012)).
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plan to situate itself as a shelter for web hosting with near legal
impunity.10
But these cases are exceptional. Overall, impediments to
cross-border enforcement of laws governing publishing are giving
way to advances in law and technology. Nations operating in the
western legal traditions are converging on norms surrounding Internet-based personal jurisdiction since the Australian High Court
more than a decade ago, in Dow Jones & Co. v. Gutnick," extended its nation's long arms, and viable analyses and proposals now
abound.12 Technologically and legally, nations have reached their
wits' ends with Internet piracy and are at the national level frequently blocking access to offending services, such as torrent
downloads.' 3 Publishers' insurers similarly are demanding that
10.

E.g., Wes Ritchie, Note, Why IMMI Matters: The First Glass For-

tress in the Age of WikiLeaks, 35 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 451, 453-54

(2012) (explaining Icelandic Modem Media Initiative Proposal); see also Afua
Hirsch, Iceland Aims to Become a Legal Safe Haven for Journalists,GUARDIAN
(July 11, 2010), http://www.theguardian.com/media/2010/jul/12/iceland-legalhaven-journalists-immi (discussing activist efforts to bring about legislative
reforms to make Iceland haven for media freedom).
11.
(2002) 210 CLR 575 (Austl.).
12.
E.g., Derek J. Illar, UnravelingInternationalJurisdictionalIssues on
the World Wide Web, 88 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 1, 9-16 (2010); Milana S.
Karayanidi, Internet Presents No Truly New Jurisdictional Challenges, LAW
TECH., Apr. 1, 2011, at 1, available at 2011 WLNR 17326034; Kevin A
Meehan, Note, The Continuing Conundrum of InternationalInternet Jurisdiction, 31 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 345, 355-61 (2008).

Compare Hague

Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, concluded on June 30, 2005, 44
I.L.M.
1294,
available
at
http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act-conventions.text&cid=98 (promulgating
uniform rules on jurisdiction and on recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments in civil or commercial matters), with Richard Leder, Social Media
Explosion Leaves Defamation Law at the Starting Gate, MONDAQ (July 18,
2012),
http://www.mondaq.com/australia/x/ I87256/Social+Media/Social+Me
(lamenting
dia+Explosion+Leaves+Defamation+Law+at+the+Starting+Gate
that advances to protect intellectual property across borders have outpaced development of defamation law, allowing social media to defy accountability).
13.
See, e.g., Lisa O'Carroll, Online Piracy: ISPs Ordered to Block Access to Three File-Sharing Websites, GUARDIAN (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://www.theguardian.com/media/2013/feb/28/online-piracy-isps-block-access
(reporting a U.K. court order to Internet service providers to block access to
pirate websites); Researchers Study National Efforts to Censor Traffic on the
Internet,

UNIV.

OF

N.M.

SCH.

OF

ENG'G

(Apr.

29,

2010),
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clients employ geo-blocking technology to reduce liability exposure.14 Ultimately, the reach of the online publisher may be limited by law and technology on the receiving end, regardless of the
location of servers. And even so, convergence on norms of free
expression and consumer privacy will render domestic courts more
willing to entertain the enforcement of foreign court orders, restoring conventional principles of comity. Refuge for the online publisher is slowly shrinking.' 5
B. Problem
The focus of this Article is the potential for civil liability
for the online re-publisher of leaked corporate secrets. That focus
has three key components-(1) civil liability, (2) re-publisher liability, and (3) corporate secrets-and in these respects departs
from the substantial body of research already published in the legal
literature related to the broad theme of liability for leaking secrets.
The literature to date has focused on criminal liability for the leak(describhttp://www.unm.edu/-soe/latest/jan-junel0/InternetCensorship.html
ing Chinese government's efforts to censor Internet, including filtering at the
national level); K.J. Shashidhar, Can't Censor; People Will Find New Ways to
Torrent,
TIMES
OF
INDIA
(May
29,
2012),
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-05-29/internet/31887453-1
bittorrent-torrentz-pirate-bay (asserting ease by which use of proxy server can
subvert Indian court order to Internet service provider to block access to torrent
downloads).
14. Blake Keating, Vice President, Media Claims, OneBeacon Professional Ins., Remarks at New Media Economy: Legal and Insurance Perspectives
on New Business Models and Evolving Exposure, Panel of Media & the Law
Seminar at the University of Kansas (Apr. 18, 2013); see also Michael Geist,
'Geo-Blocking' Websites is a Business Rather Than Legal Issue, TORONTO
STAR
(July
5,
2010),
http://www.thestar.com/business/2010/07/05/geist geoblocking websites is a
business rather than legal issue.html; Anick Jesdanun, Geolocation Tech Slices, Dices World Wide Web, USA TODAY
(July 10, 2004),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/tech/news/2004-07-10-web-geolocation x.htm.
See generally Kevin F. King, Personal Jurisdiction,Internet Commerce, and
Privacy: The Pervasive Legal Consequences of Modern Geolocation Technologies, 21 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 61, 104-23 (2011) (discussing geo-location
mandates); Marketa Trimble, The Future of Cybertravel: Legal Implications of
the Evasion of Geolocation, 22 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.
567, 586-98 (2012) (discussing use and operation of geo-location tools).
15. See Geist, supra note 14. But see supratext accompanying note 10.
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er of government secrets, and to a lesser extent criminal liability
for the re-publisher of government secrets.
Much literature in law has studied the problem of liability
for leaking, usually the problem of criminal liability for the leaker
of government secrets.16 A classic case in American jurisprudence
demonstrates this fact pattern in the context of leaked records
about the U.S. war in Vietnam. Applying the rule against prior
restraint-a cornerstone free-speech doctrine documented by
Blackstone in the British common-law tradition 1-the U.S. Supreme Court in the 1971 PentagonPapers case cleared the way for
major daily newspapers in the United States to publish leaked records unflattering to the U.S. government. But that fact pattern is
narrow in two critical respects. First, publication of the records,
inarguably upon hindsight at least, did nothing to imperil troops
then deployed at war because the records were historical in nature.19 Second, the newspapers were not complicit in the theft of
16.

See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., R41404,

CRIMINAL

PROHIBITIONS

ON

OF

THE PUBLICATION

CLASSIFIED DEFENSE

INFORMATION 8-16 (2013) (analyzing theories of criminal liability in U.S. fed-

eral law for persons who leaked classified national security information); Kellie
C. Clark & David Barnette, The Application of the Reporter's Privilege and the
Espionage Act to WikiLeaks, 37 U. DAYTON L. REV. 165, 179-83 (2012) (discussing the possibility of prosecution under the Espionage Act of 1917, absent
the First Amendment qualified privilege); Richard J. Peltz-Steele, U.S. Business
Tort Liabilityfor the TransnationalRepublisher of Leaked CorporateSecrets, I
AMITY

J.

MEDIA

&

COMM.

STUDS.

68,

71

(2011),

available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract=1947129 (examining potential liability under U.S. business tort law for WikiLeaks as a transnational re-publisher of leaked corporate
secrets); Janelle Allen, Comment, Assessing the First Amendment as a Defense
for WikiLeaks and Other Publishers of Previously Undisclosed Government
Information, 46 U.S.F. L. REV. 783, 791-97 (2012) (discussing criminal prosecution under the prior-restraint test and under the Espionage Act).
17.
Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS.
COMMENTARIES

648,

651 (1955)
*151-52),

(citing

4

WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
at
available

http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/fsspapers/2804.
18.
N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
19.
Id. at 722 n.3 (Douglas, J., concurring); see id. at 726-27 (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("Thus, only governmental allegation and proof that publication
must inevitably, directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event

kindred to imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the
issuance of an interim restraining order.").
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the secrets from government offices, though they knew of the
theft. 20 Rather, the records had been taken and delivered by government contractor Daniel Ellsberg.21 The original "publisher,"
invoking the legal term of art to mean merely a transmitter to a
third party, Ellsberg, was criminally prosecuted. 22 The government later abandoned the prosecution amid revelations of its own
misconduct.2 3
An ongoing analogous case also concerns criminal liability
for a leaker of government secrets but holds the potential to push
past the narrow facts of the Pentagon Papers and past the uncomplicated rule against prior restraint. 24 Bradley Manning, 2 5 a soldier
20. See id. at 754 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (stating that the factor of complicity within the theft should have been given consideration in the case).
21.
See generally DANIEL ELLSBERG, SECRETS: A MEMOIR OF VIETNAM
AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS 299-409 (2002) (describing author's removal and
copying of Pentagon records); THE MOST DANGEROUS MAN IN AMERICA:
DANIEL ELLSBERG AND THE PENTAGON PAPERS (First Run Features 2009)

(dramatizing Ellsberg biography at time of Pentagon Papers scandal).
22. See, e.g., Douglas 0. Linder, Famous Trials: PentagonPapers (Daniel Ellsberg) Trial: An Account, UNIV. OF Mo.-KAN. CITY SCH. OF LAW,

http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/ellsberg/ellsberghome.html
(last
visited Nov. 18, 2013) (recounting the criminal prosecution, ultimately abandoned, of Ellsberg in Pentagon Papers).
23. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, What if Daniel Ellsberg Hadn't Bothered?,
45 IND. L. REV. 89, 89-90 (2011) (discussing government decision to abandon
Ellsberg prosecution); Melville B. Nimmer, National Security Secrets v. Free
Speech: The Issues Left Undecided in the Ellsberg Case, 26 STAN. L. REV. 311,
327-33 (1974) (discussing legal issues left unresolved because the government
abandoned Ellsberg prosecution).
24. See, e.g., Derek E. Bambauer, Essay, Consider the Censor, 1 WAKE
FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 31, 33-34, 46-47 (2011) (challenging wisdom of compari-

son between The New York Times and WikiLeaks); Patricia L. Bellia, WikiLeaks
and the InstitutionalFramework for National Security Disclosures, 121 YALE
L.J. 1448, 1472-1503 (2012) (analyzing WikiLeaks case in relation to Pentagon
Papers);Kyle Lewis, Note, Wikifreak-Out: The Legality of PriorRestraints on
WikiLeaks' Publicationof Government Documents, 38 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y
417, 434-39 (2012) (applying prior restraints doctrine of Pentagon Papers to
WikiLeaks).
25.
Since his court-martial concluded, Manning has assumed a feminine
name and publicly stated his transgender identity. Emmarie Huetteman, 7 Am a
Female,'Manning Announces, Asking Army for Hormone Therapy, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/us/bradley-manning-sayshe-is-female.html?_r-l1&.
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in the U.S. Army, was court-martialed for leaking records of U.S.
war conduct in Afghanistan and Iraq, 26 including the infamous video of a Baghdad airstrike that killed Reuters journalists and likely
innocent civilians. 27 Manning was also charged with leaking a vast
Ellsberg identified
reservoir of secret U.S. diplomatic cables.
himself with Manning and called for his release. 29 The prosecution
of Manning on the most serious charges of aiding the enemy-on
which he was found not guilty30 -focused on the requisite culpability under U.S. law, that is, specifically, whether he knew that the
releases would be harmful to U.S. interests.3 1 There can be little
doubt that Manning is culpable for some criminal offenses for having leaked government secrets;32 he was convicted on multiple
counts under the Espionage Act for copying and disseminating
classified documents. 33 The more difficult question for legal
scholars, and a question contemplated by the Congressional Re-

26.

See, e.g., David Gespass, The Bradley Manning Case: Executive

Power vs. Citizens' Rights, 69 NAT'L LAW. GUILD REV. 186, 187 (2012) (re-

counting alleged conduct of Manning).
27.
Collateral Murder, W1KILEAKS, http://www.collateralmurder.com
(last visited Nov. 18, 2013).
28.
E.g., Kate Kovarovic, When the Nation Springs a [Wiki]Leak: The
"NationalSecurity" Attack on Free Speech, 14 TOURO INT'L L. REv. 273, 30001 (2011) (linking Manning leaks with diplomatic cable scandal). See generally
Geoffrey Schotter, Shouting Fire in a Burning Theater: Distinguishing Fourth
Estatefrom Fifth Column in the Age of WikiLeaks, 2 CASE W. RES. J.L. TECH. &
INTERNET 117, 117-22 (2011) (explaining impact of cable releases).
29.
E.g., Sandra Davidson, Leaks, Leakers, and Journalists:Adding Historical Context to the Age of WikiLeaks, 34 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 27, 90

(2011) (reporting Ellsberg's arrest at protest of Manning prosecution); see also
The Colbert Report: InternationalManhunt for Julian Assange - Daniel Ellsberg (Comedy Central television broadcast Dec. 9, 2010), available at
http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/36813 1/december-092010/international-manhunt-for-julian-assange---daniel-ellsberg
(interviewing
Daniel Ellsberg).
30.
E.g., Julie Tate, Judge Sentences Bradley Manning to 35 Years,
WASH. POST (Aug. 21, 2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0821/world/41431547 1 bradley-manning-david-coombs-pretrial-confinement
(reporting sentencing).
31.
Davidson, supra note 29, at 28-35, 80-87.
32.
Id. at 87.
33.
See Tate, supra note 30.
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search Service,3 4 is the potential criminal responsibility of WikiLeaks, the online re-publisher of the leaked materials. 35 According to reports at the time of this writing, WikiLeaks founder,
spokesperson, and apparent head Julian Assange remains in the
Ecuadorian embassy in London in resistance to a request for extradition by Swedish authorities investigating an alleged sexual assault.36 Assange has asserted that the investigation is a mere ruse
in furtherance of his eventual extradition to the United States to
face criminal charges for WikiLeaks publications. 3 7 For the time,
then, jurisdiction over WikiLeaks, which has servers in Europe and
a largely anonymous workforce, 38 remains a stubborn procedural
impediment to U.S. prosecution. Were that prosecution to occur, it
would pose the Pentagon Papers dilemma in a context in which
jeopardy of troops and complicity in theft offer more nuanced inquiries of fact.

34.
JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41404, CRIMINAL
PROHIBITIONS ON THE PUBLICATION OF CLASSIFIED DEFENSE INFORMATION 8-

16(2013).
35.
See Espionage Act and the Legal and ConstitutionalIssues Raised by
WikiLeaks: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 39
(2010); see also Davidson, supra note 29, at 90; James Freedman, Note, Protecting State Secrets as IntellectualProperty:A Strategyfor ProsecutingWikiLeaks,
48 STAN. J. INT'L L. 185, 207-08 (2012).

36. Kevin Rawlinson & Sam Masters, Don't Forget About My Rights,
Says Julian Assange 'Sex Victim,' INDEPENDENT (May 23, 2013),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/dont-forget-about-myrights-says-julian-assange-sex-victim-8630046.html.
See generally Schotter,
supra note 28, at 122-25 (describing U.S. congressional will to have Assange
extradited to U.S. for criminal prosecution); Molly Thebes, Note, The Prospect
of ExtraditingJulian Assange, 37 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 889, 889-98
(2012) (describing Assange's predicament in relation to journalism and extradition law).
37. E.g., Robert Mackey, Swedish ProsecutorRaises Possible Extradition
of WikiLeaks Founder to U.S., LEDE BLOG (Dec. 14, 2010, 2:43 PM),
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/swedish-prosecutor-raisespossible-extradition-of-wikileaks-founder-to-u-s/ (reporting the Swedish prosecutor's explanation of legal maneuvers that would permit extradition of Assange
to the United States).
38. See generally David Comeil, Harboring WikiLeaks: ComparingSwedish and American Press Freedom in the Internet Age, 41 CAL. W. INT'L L.J.
477, 491-96 (2011) (describing WikiLeaks' connection to Sweden).
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While both PentagonPapers and a hypothetical WikiLeaks
prosecution raise the compelling possibility of re-publisher culpability under law, neither case varies the problem in the two other
dimensions that are key to this study: civil prosecution by a corporate plaintiff. To date, such cases have been deterred by the unwieldiness of the Internet, specifically the aforementioned disparities in norms of free speech and jurisdiction. 39 But as law and
technological controls catch up with global online communication,
the path to civil prosecution will be cleared. Already, the global
corporate plaintiff is no stranger to international forum-shopping.4 0
Converging legal norms will ease the way for court orders to cross
borders, and technological measures at the level of national infrastructure, wielded by governments and demanded by insurers, will
block the receipt of online information even when electronic points
of origin defy control.
In much of the world, corporate control of information flow
is already a problem on par with government control of information. Otherwise said, the distinction between government and
corporations should not matter in global policy as much as it does
in national laws. Organizations, such as Transparency International, promote the freedom of information in public and private sectors alike, recognizing that secrecy breeds corruption in both. 4 1 As
the recent world economic crisis has demonstrated, corruption,
irresponsibility, and unaccountability in the private sector-as
much as in the public sector-threaten security, stability, and the
welfare even of individuals with no close connection to national
39.
See Libel Tourism: Hearing on H.R. 6146 Before the Subcomm. on
Commercial andAdmin. Law of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, I11th Cong. 20
(2009).
40.
See, e.g., Markus Petsche, What's Wrong with Forum Shopping? An
Attempt to Identify and Assess the Real Issues of a ControversialPractice, 45
INT'L LAW. 1005, 1006-09 (2011) (overviewing international forum-shopping);
Christopher A. Whytock, The Evolving Forum Shopping System, 96 CORNELL L.
REV. 481, 506-16 (2011) (analyzing the occurrence of transnational litigation in
U.S. courts).
41.
See Frederick Schauer, Transparency in Three Dimensions, 2011 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1339, 1341-42 (2011) (emphasizing private-sector transparency);
see also Corruption by

Topic: Private Sector, TRANSPARENCY

http://www.transparency.org/topic/detail/private
2013).

INT'L,

sector (last visited Nov. 19,
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governments or big banks.42 American involvement in the Middle
East in the decade after September 11 was at times undermined by
public procurement scandalS 43 and private contractors' misconduct.44 Multinational corporations have born responsibility for
human and environmental disasters from Bhopal 45 to the Gulf oil
spill. 46 In the developing world, corporations conduct quasimilitary operations to commercial ends upon dubious arrangements
that enrich local governments.4 7 Understandably, whistleblowers
42.

See, e.g., Kerry Skyring & Kyle James, UN's New Anti-Corruption

Academy Aims Spotlight at FinancialCrime, DEUTSCHE WELLE (June 9, 2010),

http://www.dw.de/uns-new-anti-corruption-academy-aims-spotlight-at-financialcrime/a-5971657 (citing World Bank estimate of cost to world economy of corruption at two trillion dollars and quoting European economic official: "People
no longer believe that there is equality, that the law applies to everyone .... ).
43. See, e.g., Richard Baker, Wheat is War, and U.S. Enjoys a Triumph
Without
Scrutiny,
THE
AGE
(Nov.
25,
2006),
http://www.theage.com.au/news/national/wheat-is-war-and-us-enjoys-atriumph-without-scrutiny/2006/11/24/1164341396678.html (describing jockeying of U.S. and Australian businesses, reportedly aided by governments and
questionable tactics such as kickbacks and subsidies, to capture the Iraqi wheat
market).
44. See, e.g., Tom Allard, Beware of the Protectors,SYDNEY MORNING
HERALD (Sept. 22, 2007), http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/beware-of-theprotectors/2007/09/21/1189881777362.html?page=fullpage#contentSwap2 (describing reports of misconduct by U.S. private security contractors in Iraq, including multiple reports of firing on civilians and consequent anger of Iraqis).
45.
See, e.g., Fergus M. Bordewich, The Lessons of Bhopal; The Lure of
Foreign Capital is Stronger than Environmental Worries, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1,
1987, at 30, available at 1987 WLNR 2001184 (describing an environmental
disaster in Bhopal, India, and how the lure of foreign capital from multinational
corporations in third-world countries overrides the negative environmental implications caused by the lack of safety precautions and standards).
46. See, e.g., Chris Watt, BP Faces £3.6bn Bill as Oil-Spill Environmental
Disaster Unfolds,
HERALD
(Scotland)
(May
1,
2010),
http://www.heraldscotland.com/news/transport-environment/bp-faces-3-6bnbill-as-oil-spill-environmental-disaster-unfolds- 1.1024513
(describing BP's
response to massive oil spill and acceptance of financial responsibility for damages).
47. E.g., James Rupert, Diamond Hunters Fuel Africa's Brutal Wars,
WASH.
POST
(Oct.
16,
1999), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/inatl/daily/oct99/sierral 6.htm (describing ties and trades of money and gems
for services between the Sierra Leone's government and private corporations
with quasi-military forces).
See generally P.W. SINGER, CORPORATE
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such as WikiLeaks profess allegiance to people, rather than to institutions, and do not discriminate between governmental and corporate targets when publishing revelations of public importance.4 8
Of great interest, then, is an assessment of the current potential for civil liability for the re-publisher of leaked corporate
secrets. This question is both similar to-and different from-the
problem of criminal prosecution of the re-publisher of leaked government secrets. To be sure, analysis of the civil question in many
respects overlaps with the criminal analysis, especially where
common facts form the evidentiary basis for a defendant's culpability. But the criminal question is far from easily resolved, as indicated by the narrow reach of the Pentagon Papers decision. As
in the Manning prosecution, criminal prosecution presents challenges of scienter even where the original leaker is concerned,
problems that are compounded in the case of the re-publisher. The
complexity of prosecution is compounded again when the frame of
reference changes from criminal to civil, because civil liability,
especially associative liability with joint tortfeasors, may rest upon
a lesser state of culpability and a lesser burden of proof than criminal conviction. Thus, tort remedies may be available upon strict
liability or negligence proved to a preponderance of the evidence,
rather than specific intent proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, the key re-publisher's defense of freedom of expression
does not operate the same in civil and criminal contexts. The freedom's contours as an affirmative defense are ill defined in both
contexts, but arguably the freedom of expression, as a right of the
individual against the state, should have no application at all when
the complainant is a private party.
C

Method

This study examines civil liability in the context of two fact
patterns, drawn from real cases, which neatly illustrate the problem
WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY INDUSTRY 191-229 (updated ed. 2008) (describing the role of private firms in contemporary military con-

flicts).
48.
E.g., Transcript of Secret Meeting Between Julian Assange and
Google CEO Eric Schmidt, supra note 1 ("I don't see a different [sic] between
government and big corporations and small corporations, actually this is all one
continuum, these are all systems that are trying to get as much power as possible.").
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of corporate leaker and subsequent publisher. One pattern arises in
the conventional world of sources, journalists, and news, and the
other in the frontier paradigm of electronic data and the seeming
anarchy of online publishing. The problem is analyzed in U.S. tort
law, including common law and the law of unfair competition and
trade-secret appropriation. The analysis employs multistate common-law precedents from U.S. statutes, court decisions, and secondary sources to generalize the relevant body of law in the fifty
states. The study assumes that procedural obstacles-namely, personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, and extraterritorial
application of law-can be overcome and advances the analysis to
the merits of the two cases that U.S. courts never decided.
The first defendant is CBS, a national U.S. broadcaster and
one of the only three networks that were identified with TV news
in the early decades of U.S. television. CBS in the mid-1990s
feared a lawsuit by tobacco giant Brown & Williamson over investigation by the broadcast newsmagazine 60 Minutes into damaging
allegations by scientist Jeffrey Wigand about smoking and public
health. 49 Brown & Williamson later did sue Wigand, a former employee, asserting theft, fraud, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty of confidentiality, and appropriation of trade secret.o
Brown & Williamson never sued CBS, the re-publisher of leaked
corporate secrets in this scenario, 1 though fear of a lawsuit for
tortious interference caused turmoil within the corporation and

49. Marie Brenner, The Man Who Knew Too Much, VANITY FAIR (May
1996),
http://www.vanityfair.com/magazine/archive/1996/05/wigandl99605;
see also 60 Minutes: Wigand: 60 Minutes' Most Famous Whistleblower (CBS
television
broadcast
Aug.
21,
2011),
available
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7377558n. For a transcript of the
original 1996 broadcast, see Jeffrey Wigand on 60 Minutes, February4, 1996,
JEFFREYWIGAND.COM, http://www.jeffreywigand.com/60minutes.php (last visited Nov. 19, 2013).
50. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, 913 F. Supp.
530, 531 (W.D. Ky. 1996) (remanding to state court); see also Brown & Williamson
Tobacco
Corp.
v.
Wigand,
TOBACCO
DOCUMENTS,
http://tobaccodocuments.org/profiles/litigation/wigand.html (last visited Nov.
19, 2013) (referencing the 1995 suit in Kentucky Circuit Court).
51.
Cf Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Wigand, 643 N.Y.S.2d
92, 93 (App. Div. 1996) (affirming quash of subpoena of CBS documents collateral to Kentucky litigation).
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news operation.5 2 The whole affair was documented in a Vanity
Fair story, The Man Who Knew Too Much,53 and became the subject of the critically acclaimed 1999 movie-fictionalized to a disputed degree-The Insider.54 This study will consider whether
Brown & Williamson could have sued CBS successfully.
The second defendant is WikiLeaks, the web provider that
became famous worldwide for its publication of leaked records
implicating controversial U.S. conduct in the wars in the Middle
East.5 5 WikiLeaks and its one-time U.S.-based Internet service
provider, Dynadot, were sued in federal district court in California
by Swiss-based Bank Julius Baer56 after WikiLeaks posted leaked
records revealing customer information and suspicious business
practices in the Cayman Islands branch of the bank.57 The records
identified multiple accountholders, and critics of the bank asserted
that the records provided evidence of wrongdoing, including money laundering.
Baer Bank sought and obtained a permanent injunction from the court to shut down the WikiLeaks domain "wikileaks.org," maintained by Dynadot; WikiLeaks did not appear in
the case. 59 The bank's victory, however, was Pyrrhic. Recognizing the threat of an injunction in U.S. courts, websites around the
52.
E.g., Brenner, supra note 49 (recounting tense interactions between
CBS News and CBS corporate officials as the Wigand story developed).
Id
53.
54.
THE INSIDER (Spyglass Entertainment & Touchstone Pictures 1999),
http://www.dailyscript.com/scripts/theshooting script available at
insider shooting.html.
55.
See Yochai Benkler, A Free Irresponsible Press: WikiLeaks and the
Battle Over the Soul of the Networked Fourth Estate, 46 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 311, 325-30 (2011) (reviewing the history of WikiLeaks). See generally
James P. Kelly, Jr., WikiLeaks: A Guidefor American Law Librarians, 104 LAW
LIBR. J. 245, 245-57 (2012) (overviewing law and policy related to WikiLeaks).
56. Bank Julius Baer & Co. v. WikiLeaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 982
(N.D. Cal. 2008).
57.
Olesya Dmitracova & Chris Vellacott, Swiss Whistleblower Hands
Bank Data to WikiLeaks, REUTERS (Jan. 17, 2011, 1:32 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/17/us-wikileaks-swissidUSTRE70FOT
F20110117.
58. Henry Weinstein, Swiss Bank Pulls WikiLeaks Lawsuit, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2008), http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/06/local/me-briefs6.S6.
59. Bank Julius Baer & Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 982-83 (recounting the
procedural background and terms of the injunctions).
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world mirrored wikileaks.org. The leaked information could not
be contained by the court injunction, and Baer Bank learned a hard
lesson on "the Streisand effect," 60 by which efforts to remove
online information inadvertently multiply the dissemination.61
Then faced with an outcry from free-expression advocates and the
effective mootness of its order, the court dissolved the injunction. 62
This study will consider whether Baer Bank could have succeeded
in a civil prosecution of WikiLeaks.
The study is limited to U.S. tort law, including common
law and the law of unfair competition and trade-secret appropriation.63 Certainly tort law in the United States is neither a necessary
starting point nor an essential ending point for this analysis when
multinational corporations have access to courts around the world.
Indeed, analyzing the problem in U.S. law risks returning a false
negative; that is, if civil prosecution is found not possible in U.S.
law, that conclusion does not necessarily infer comparable results
in other nations' courts, nor even in the courts of other commonlaw countries. However, exploring potential liability in U.S.
courts, owing to the renowned liberal tradition of press freedom in
the United States, is unlikely to signal a false positive. In fact,
considering the capacity of multinational plaintiffs to forum-shop
for permissive regimes, the expansive long-arm personal jurisdiction of the United States, and the global interconnectedness of the
U.S. economic market and communications infrastructure, potential liability in the United States would signal a major vulnerability
for publishers. At a minimum, exploration of the issue in the United States is a place to start and may provide a pattern for analysis
60. The term comes from American entertainer Barbara Streisand, whose
attempt in 2003 to suppress aerial photographs of her private residence inadvertently generated worldwide publicity. Peltz-Steele, supra note 16, at 71.
61.
Id.; see also Mike Masnick, Bank Julius Baer Drops Lawsuit Against
WikiLeaks,
TECH
DIRT
(Mar.
5,
2008,
4:34
PM),
http://www.techdirt.com/articIes/20080305/152959451.shtml.
62. Bank Julius Baer & Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d at 984-85; see also Thomas
Claburn, WikiLeaks Wins Back Its Domain, INFO. WK. (Feb. 29, 2008, 8:00
PM), http://www.informationweek.com/wikileaks-wins-back-its-domain/
206901172.
63.
Trade secrets and unfair-competition law lie at the fuzzy border of
tort and intellectual property, but the line must be drawn somewhere. For a fullon immersion in the potential of copyright law to wrangle WikiLeaks, see
Freedman, supra note 35, at 193-204, 207-08.
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in other jurisdictions, especially in countries observing comparable
civil rights norms.
A further limitation of this study is its focus on substantive
rather than procedural law. The problems of personal and subjectmatter jurisdiction have already been alluded to, and they, as well
as extraterritorial application of law, merit their own study. Jurisdiction has been and remains a problem in all aspects of law that
touch on the Internet, from intellectual-property piracy, to criminal
incitement to violence, to civil liability for defamation. These
problems arise from divergent national norms that are suddenly
juxtaposed when communications technology races ahead of developments in international law and technological controls. Experience indicates, though, that such problems are surmountable over
time as legal norms converge and nations negotiate disparities.
Thus, owing to commercial incentives and hard lobbying by intellectual-property owners, governments and corporations together
are developing and deploying countermeasures to combat piracy.
Legal and technological means are coming into use both within
and across borders to track and unmask anonymous Internet users
in criminal and civil cases. In time, it is similarly expected that
corporate plaintiffs will surmount the procedural and technological
barriers to re-publisher liability, whether through the enforcement
of imported foreign judgments to reach defendants where they reside or do business, or through controls on the flow of information
such as geo-blocks. Accepting that jurisdiction will play out as a
technological arms race between governmental and private pursuers, on the one hand, and defendant publishers who seek to stay
one step ahead, on the other hand, this paper focuses on the substantive law of civil liability, whether for injunctive relief or damages.
II. ANALYSIS OF CORPORATE PLAINTIFF VS. MEDIA DEFENDANT

Though Baer Bank was never decided on the merits,64 the
complaint in that case provides a starting point to examine the conSee Notice of Dismissal, Bank Julius Baer & Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d
at
available
CVO8-0824),
(No.
980
(stating
105.pdf
v
wikileaks/wikileaks
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/baer
that plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed action without prejudice).
64.
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temporary problem of corporate plaintiff, victim of an information
leak, versus media defendant, re-publisher of the information.
Baer Bank sued WikiLeaks for (1) tortious interference with contract and with prospective economic advantage, (2) violation of
unfair-competition law, and (3) conversion (civil theft).6 5 In its
standoff with Brown & Williamson, CBS focused on tortious interference with contract. 6 6
Defamation is not available in the ordinary case of a corporate leak because the data disclosed is not false. 67 In the tobacco
case, CBS was not worried about falsity: the network had evidence to corroborate Wigand's assertions,6 8 and by the time of
broadcast the network had the advantage of the fair report privilege, 69 which can protect even false reports. 70 Furthermore, invasion of privacy is not available in the ordinary case of a corporate
leak because the information disclosed is not personal or intimate. 7 1 The Baer Bank complaint incorporated allegations of privacy invasion within the unfair-competition claim, citing disclosure of customer data in violation of banking and consumer law, 72
but even if that data were sufficiently intimate to warrant protection in tort, the bank would be a co-defendant, not a plaintiff.
Following on the Baer Bank model, this study examines
(1) tortious interference, (2) unfair competition, and (3) theories
65.
Complaint at 15, 21-25, Bank Julius Baer & Co., 535 F. Supp. 2d
980
(No.
CV-08-00824),
available
at
http://www.jdsupra.con/legalnews/complaint-for-unlawful-amp-unfair-bus94309/. Additional counts addressed remedies, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in equity. Id. at 19-20, 25-28.
66. See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 49 (recounting focus of CBS counsel
on liability expense for tortious interference).
67.
See, e.g., ROBERT D. SACK, 1 SACK ON DEFAMATION: LIBEL,
SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMS § 2.1.1 (rev. 4th ed. 2013) (detailing falsity
as element of defamation tort).
68. Brenner, supra note 49.
69.

See, e.g., DAVID ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER'S GUIDE

§ 3:4

(2013) (detailing privilege of fair report on judicial proceedings).
70. See id.
§ 3:1.
71.
See, e.g., J.D. LEE & BARRY LINDAHL, 5 MODERN TORT LAW:
LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 48:9 (rev. 2d ed. 2013) (explaining that public

disclosure of private facts is a form of invasion of privacy); see also id. § 48:6
(explaining that intrusion upon seclusion is a form of invasion of privacy).
72. Complaint, supra note 65, 1 34.
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related to the theft of plaintiffs secrets. Tortious interference was
common to the tobacco and WikiLeaks cases, so that claim is
treated first. That treatment introduces points of law and fact that
are relevant to the subsequent analyses. Appropriation of trade
secrets, a statutory tort arising in unfair-competition law, is considered in the third part of the analysis rather than the second because
it is essentially a theory of civil theft. The third part of the study
also expands the analysis beyond the limited scope of conversion
to consider additional theories predicated on the theft of plaintiffs
secrets-namely, trespass to chattels and breach of confidence.
The analyses also consider theories of associative, or joint, liability, as the key to the plaintiffs success might lie in tying the defendant to the misconduct of the leaker, or original publisher. The
core doctrine of associative liability is set out in the examination of
tortious interference.
The possibility always exists that a state or national government passes a statute specifically creating liability for a republisher. In that situation, the plaintiffs prima facie case would
be made, and the relevant point of inquiry would be constitutional
defenses alone. Free-speech defenses are considered in relation to
each of the following analyses with the core doctrine set out in the
examination of tortious interference.
A.

Tortious Interference

Baer Bank filed two counts of tortious interference against
WikiLeaks; 73 accordingly, at common law in the United States,
there are two interference torts: (a) intentional interference with
contract, and (b) intentional interference with prospective economic advantage. 7 4 As the names suggest, both torts require intent.75
In short, tortious interference occurs when an actor engages in
conduct with the purpose of interfering with the performance of a
contract or with the coming to fruition of an economic advantage,

73.
Id. TT 49-59.
74.
See, e.g., LEE & LINDAHL, supra note 71, § 45:1 (introducing tortious
interference with contractual relations).
75.
See id. §§ 45:3, 45:11 (explaining tortious interference with contractual relations and tortious interference with prospective contractual relations,
respectively).
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or the actor should know that interference is substantially certain to
occur, and interference results. 76
1. Intent and Impropriety
The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a starting point
for study, as it represents the common law of the various state jurisdictions of the United States.77 The Restatement articulates two
avenues to reach interference with contract-a basic rule and an
alternative formulation. Section 766 provides the basic rule on
tortious interference:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes
with the performance of a contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person
by inducing or otherwise causing the third person
not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to
the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other
from the failure of the third person to perform the
contract. 78
The plaintiffs burden under this standard is manifold. The plaintiff must prove the existence of a valid contract and that the defendant induced or otherwise caused the third party to breach or
not perform; the causal link is indispensable. 79
Furthermore, the plaintiff must prove that defendant acted
both intentionally and improperly.8 0 The former requirement, intentionality, is a subjective state-of-mind inquiry, never easy to
prove in non-physical tort cases absent the rare smoking gun. Intent is more than volitional conduct; it is present when an actor
76. For a short history and modem statement of tortious interference, and
a thorough literature review to its time, see Elisa Masterson White, Comment,
Arkansas Tortious Interference Law: A Proposal for Change, 19 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 81, 82-88, 93-100 (1996).
77. See generally Herbert Wechsler, Introduction to RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, at VIl-IX (1965) (discussing changes in the common law
between the first two Restatements of Torts).
78.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1979).
79. See id § 766 cmt. k.
80. See id § 766 cmt. j.
81.
86 C.J.S. Torts § 22 (2006).
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"desires to cause consequences of his act, or . . . he believes that

the consequences are substantially certain to result from it."82 Intent in interference comprises knowledge of the economic relation
interfered with and a substantial certainty that interference will
result, though some courts require more specificity of intent. 83
Implicit in intentionality is that defendant is in some measure cognizant of the existence of plaintiffs contractual interest, else there
would be nothing for defendant to intend interference with. 84 In an
effort to aid in the intent analysis, many courts have examined the
interfering act for "malice" or "maliciousness," though it is well
settled that the term refers to legal malice-that is, intent to do
harm without justification, rather than to malice in the historic
common-law sense of spite or ill will.85 For example, the Connecticut Court of Appeals in IN Energy Solutions, Inc. v. Realgy,
L.L.C., construed the element of "malice" not to mean ill will but
defendant's lack of justification, a proof charged to the plaintiff.86
Nevertheless, ill will may go to the element of impropriety, 87a
term of art discussed below.
An alternative formulation of the rule for interference with
contract offers plaintiffs on some facts an easier avenue to liability.
Section 766A of the Restatement describes as actionable the burdening of a plaintiffs performance on plaintiffs own contract, as
by greater expense, rather than inducement of breach or nonperformance. 88 The Wyoming Supreme Court found the 766A

82.
83.
TORTS

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).
White, supra note 76, at 85 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

§ 766 cmt. j (1979)).
§ 766 cmt. i (1979).

84.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

85.

Id. § 766 cmts. r, s.

86.
87.

969 A.2d 807, 815 (Conn. App. Ct. 2009).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 cmt. r,

88.

Id. § 766A.

§ 767 cmt. d (1979).
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avenue too permissive and susceptible to abuse so disallowed it, 89
and the question remains open elsewhere. 90
Interference with prospective economic relations, which
requires no extant contract at the time of interference, is further
described by Restatement section 766B. 91 The section contemplates liability resulting from interference on the plaintiff or on the
third-party side of the prospective relationship. A threshold question arises as to whether the economic relationship was so likely to
come to fruition that the plaintiff fairly may be afforded legal protection in the prospective interest.92 The Third Circuit once characterized prospective economic advanta e as "something less than
a right and something more than hope"9 and exemplarily required
that the relationship stand upon a "reasonable probability." 94 Stated in terms of causation, tortious interference with prospective
economic advantage occurs when there is a reasonable probability
that a benefit or opportunity would have been conferred on the
plaintiff but for the defendant's interference. 95 Some courts have
required flatly that a business relationship would have occurred but

89. Price v. Sorrell, 784 P.2d 614, 616 (Wyo. 1989) (opining, where
debtor's attorney allegedly interfered with contractual relationship between
creditor and its attorney by sending a letter to hospital questioning its hiring of a
debt collector for the hospital, that the court was "convinced that such an element of proof is too speculative and subject to abuse to provide a meaningful
basis for a cause of action").
90. See, e.g., Gemini Physical Therapy & Rehab., Inc. v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 63, 66 (3d Cir. 1994) (deciding issues of Pennsylvania
law).
91.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B (1979). See generally
James B. Sales, The Tort of Interference with Contract: An Argument for Requiring a "Valid Existing Contract" to Restrain the Use of Tort Law in Circumventing Contract Law Remedies, 22 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 123, 154-55 (1991)
(concluding that interference upon prospective economic relations improperly
blurs line between tort and contract law).
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766B cmt. c (1979).
93. Nathanson v. Med. Coll. of Pa., 926 F.2d 1368, 1392 (3d Cir. 1991)
(quoting Thompson Coal Co. v. Pike Coal Co., 412 A.2d 466, 471 (Pa. 1979)).
94. Id. (quoting Gen. Sound Tel. Co. v. AT & T Commc'ns, Inc., 654 F.
Supp. 1562, 1565 (E.D. Pa. 1987)).
95. See Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park Place Entm't Corp., 217 F. Supp. 2d
423, 440 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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for the interference. 96 Merely speculative expectation of an economic advantage never suffices. 9 7
The plaintiffs burdens as to intentionality and impropriety
persist in all permutations of interference. Even after surmounting
the manifold hurdles of intent, a plaintiff typically faces the
weightiest challenge in proof of impropriety. 98 Impropriety at
common law marks one side of a coin, and the opposite side bears
the affirmative defense of "justification." 99 The duplication, affording the defendant both conventional and affirmative defenses,
emphasizes the weight of the plaintiffs burden. Either way, impropriety, or lack of justification, may be determined by a balancing of interests under the circumstances. 1o As articulated in the
Restatement, factors to be balanced include:
(a) the nature of the [defendant's] conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the [plaintiff] with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of
action of the actor and the contractual interests of
the other,
(f) the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference and
96.
See Garshman v. Universal Res. Holding, Inc., 641 F. Supp. 1359,
1374 (D.N.J. 1986); Robbins v. Ogden Corp., 490 F. Supp. 801, 811 (S.D.N.Y.
1980).
97.

44B AM. JUR. 2DInterference

§ 49

(2007).

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. a (1979).
98.
99.
Id. § 767 cmt. b; see also A. F. Arnold & Co. v Pac. Prof I Ins., Inc.,
104 Cal. Rptr. 96, 99 (Ct. App. 1972) (suggesting that some courts have treated
lack of justification as an element of the tort, rather than as a defense, because of
the historic use of the word "unjustified" in describing tort, as in such statements
as recovery may be had for unjustified interference with prospective economic
advantage).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmts. a, j (1979).
100.
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(g) the relations between the parties.'o'
Nature is the "chief factor" in the analysis, and liability may result
from defendant's improper "manner" of conduct, even if defendant
acted justifiably. 102
Improper conduct, as regarded variously by the states, may
range from conduct that is criminal or independently tortiou 1 03 to
conduct more morally than legally objectionable.1 04 The latter extreme reaches economic coercion and violation of business ethics
or custom. 105 When the defendant exercises persuasion, short of
intimidation, to have its way, interference cases diverge.1 06 Interference with prospective economic relation might require the more
concrete wrong to compensate for the more tenuous nature of the
injury.10 7 A New Jersey court described the broad view:
The very nature of . .. [tortious interference] prohibits a "rule of thumb" . . . . But where it appears
to the judge . . . from sufficient facts and the legiti-

mate inferences therefrom, that the elements of the
tort may be present, including conduct which was
both injurious and transgressive of generally accepted standards of common morality or of law, it is

101.
Id. § 767. The factors might be falling out of favor, but courts are not
settling on a consistent alternative. A 2012 survey found that thirty-seven states
have declined to use the Restatement factors. Larry Watkins, Note, Tort LawTortious Interference with Business Expectancy--A Trapfor the Wary and Unwary Alike, 34 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REv. 619, 637-38 (2012). But twentytwo of those states refer to case precedents to define impropriety, where precedents might have used the factors, and only fifteen states have adopted the
standard of an independent wrong in tort or criminal law. Id. at 638.
102.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c (1979).
103. See, e.g., Watkins, supra note 101, at 640-41 (describing Texas law).
104.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. c (1979).
105. Id.
106.
M.C. Dransfield, Annotation, Liabilityfor ProcuringBreach of Contract, 26 A.L.R.2D 1227, 1255 (1952).
107.
See, e.g., Watkins, supra note 101, at 639 (describing California law).
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then for the jury or the fact finder to decide the issue.los
The focus in determining wrongfulness "should be on the
defendant's objective conduct, and evidence of motive or other
subjective states of mind is relevant only to illuminating the nature
of that conduct."109 Thus, lawful conduct that is "motivated by a
black desire to hurt plaintiffs business" does not necessarily constitute wrongful conduct for tortious interference. "0
Though objective, the circumstance-heavy inquiry demonstrates the fuzzy nature of interference. The same conduct may be
tortious in one context and not in another. "If unlawful means are
employed, such as fraud or intimidation," or if the defendant acts
without justification and causes economic loss, then the plaintiff is
entitled to a remedy." 1 The defendant's ill will may evidence, but
cannot by itself conclusively establish, impropriety. But profit
motive is justification and therefore should relieve from liability
the defendant whose means do not violate "standards of 'socially
acceptable conduct.""' 2 The line is fine. In a Georgia interference
case by an employer against a former employee, the court found
improper interference in a subsequent employer's inducement of
its employee to break a non-disclosure contract with the former
employer." 3
2.

Common-Law Defenses and Associative Liability

If the plaintiff meets its burdens, then a range of affirmative
defenses also bears on interference cases. Of course, the defendant
can endeavor to prove justification, the inverse of impropriety,'14
and might well force a jury question on the point. The courts rec108.
C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Wordtronics Corp., 561 A.2d 694, 698 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1989) (first alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting
Leslie Blau Co. v. Alfieri, 384 A.2d 859, 866 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1978)).
109.
Amtz Contracting Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 888, 895 (Ct. App. 1996).
110.
Id.
111.
Leslie Blau Co., 384 A.2d at 865.
112.
Id. at 867.
113.
Fine v. Commc'n Trends, Inc., 699 S.E.2d 623, 633 (Ga. Ct. App.
2010).
114.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 cmt. b (1979).
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ognize other privileges that may also be described as inverses of
impropriety: a general (and ill-defined) privilege to act in the public interest,' ' a privilege to further one's own economic or legal
interests in the absence of improper means,1 1 6 a privilege to compete commercially with the plaintiff in the absence of improper
means,l1 7 a privilege to protect the welfare of a third person for
whom the defendant is responsible," 8 a privilege to give honest
counsel in good faith and upon request,"l 9 and narrow privileges to
execute organizational leadership or employment obligations.' 20
Cases exemplifying the general public-interest privilege all involve
government defendants or defendants employing the right to petition government officials.121
Interference is said to police the boundary between legitimate marketplace competition and tortious conduct.122 As such,
precise legal language is only so effective to describe what is essentially a civil wrong. Therefore, impropriety is the lynchpin of
the determination. The unavoidable consequence of contextdependent analysis is a discomforting degree of inconsistency in
what constitutes tortious conduct from case to case, court to court,
and state to state.123
Tort law provides broad grounds for an actor's associative
liability-that is, liability upon the tortious conduct of another
when harm results to a third party. In their sweep, the three disjunctive provisions of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876
subsume civil analogs to criminal conspiracy and criminal aiding
and abetting, imposing liability when the actor:
115.
44B AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 28 (2007).
116.
Id. § 29; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 773 (1979).
117.
44B AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 30; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 767 (1979).
118.
44B AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 32; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 770 (1979).
119.
44B AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 33; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 772 (1979).

120. 44B AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 34.
121.
See id § 28.
122. See Gemini Aluminum Corp. v. Cal. Custom Shapes, Inc., 116 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 358, 363-64 (Ct. App. 2002).
123. See Robert B. Gigl, Jr., The Murky World of Tortious Interference:
What Are the Rules of the Game?, N.J. LAW. MAG., Feb. 2008, at 10, 13-14,
availableat http://www.njsba.com/images/content/1/0/1002005/Feb08.pdf.
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(a) does a tortious act in concert with the other or
pursuant to a common design with him, or
(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a
breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself,
or
(c) gives substantial assistance to the other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct,
separately considered, constitutes a breach of duty
to the third person.124
Actors in tortious interference are subject to associative liability as
in any tort of negligence or intent. 125 Thus, for example, a complaint for aiding and abetting tortious interference was properly
alleged against a supervisor for his role in "directing and supervising" an associate in what the plaintiff alleged to be a scheme to
defraud and interfere with prospective economic advantage.' 26
3.

Liability Theories in BaerBank and Big Tobacco

The interference-with-contract claim in Baer Bank1 2 7 was
the same as what one could imagine in the tobacco case: that the
leak re-publisher knew of the leaker's confidentiality agreement
with the corporation and induced the leaker to break the agreement. Baer Bank alleged that WikiLeaks knew or should have
known of the confidentiality agreement between the bank and the
leaker, former bank employee Rudolf Elmer.1 28 Perhaps indisput124.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 876 (1979).

See Saunders v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 446 (Ct. App.
125.
1994) (aiding and abetting); see also Hart, Nininger & Campbell Assocs. v.
Rogers, 548 A.2d 758, 765 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (conspiracy).
Forum Fin. Grp., v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 173 F.
126.
Supp. 2d 72, 96-97 (D. Me. 2001); see also Dube v. Likins, 167 P.3d 93, 100
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) (finding lack of evidence to support plaintiff's allegation
that university officials aided and abetted a thesis advisor in interfering with
plaintiff's bid for post-graduate degree).
49-54.
127.
Complaint, supra note 65,
128.
Id % 50-51. Certainly WikiLeaks disavows knowledge of its
sources initially. See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 29, at 80 (quoting Assange:
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ably, the bank further alleged that WikiLeaks learned of the confidentiality agreement from bank counsel and still refused to remove
the postings. 129 The bank characterized WikiLeaks' maintenance
of a website that avowedly provided an "uncensorable" and "untraceable" avenue for "mass document leaking" as a "tortious
scheme to solicit the submission or upload" of confidential records
by Elmer.130 The bank further alleged that as Elmer continued
leaking documents in subsequent uploads, WikiLeaks "knowingly
and intentionally" became a "joint-tortfeasor[] with Elmer."' 3 1
In the tobacco case, an interference-with-contract claim
would have focused on 60 Minutes producer Lowell Bergman's
cultivation of Jeffrey Wigand as a source. 132 In terminating his
Brown & Williamson employment, Wigand had signed a broad
agreement to say nothing about the company.13 3 In the movie version of the tobacco case, Bergman (Al Pacino) repeatedly told
Wigand (Russell Crowe) that whether to talk to 60 Minutes was a
decision for Wigand alone to make.134 At the same time, Bergman
"We do not know whether Mr. Manning is our source or not.... [O]ur technology does not permit us to understand whether someone is one of our sources or
not because the best way to keep a secret is to never have it." (alteration in original)). Elmer was convicted in Switzerland for violating banking secrecy laws
and fined 6,000 Swiss francs. WikiLeaks Banker Escapes Jail,IRISH EXAMINER
(Jan. 19, 2011), http://www.irishexaminer.com/breakingnews/world/wikileaksbanker-escapes-jail-489967.html.
129.
Complaint, supra note 65, 29.
130. Id. 52-53.
131.
Id. 53.
132.
See Brenner, supra note 49. In a favorite scene in The Insider, a CBS
lawyer (Gina Gershon) endeavored to explain "tortious interference" to 60
Minutes staff, and a perplexed producer (Philip Baker Hall) responded for the
journalists, "Interfering? That's what we do." THE INSIDER, supra note 54.
133.
Brenner, supra note 49; see also Smoke in the Eye: Anatomy of a
Decision, PBS FRONTLINE, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/smoke/
cron.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).
134.
THE INSIDER, supra note 54. Of course, only Bergman and Wigand
know for sure what they said to one another. Writers for the movie did conduct
extensive factual investigation to render a realistic, if dramatized, portrayal of
events, so the movie is informative, for sake of hypothesis, as to what might
have occurred.
See A Talk with Lowell Bergman, PBS FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/smoke/bergman.html (last visited Oct.
24, 2013); see also Bill Carter, TV Notes; Mike Wallace Getting Over It, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 3, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/03/arts/tv-notes-mike-
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wanted the story; he walked a fine line. He impressed Wigand
with the public-health interest in the confidential information; he
appealed to Wigand on a personal level; and he arranged for Wigand to tell his story in part under the purported shield of a litigation
privilege in a collateral state investigation into Big Tobacco by the
Mississippi Attorney General (who played himself, Michael
Moore).135 When Wigand did give an interview, Bergman initially
agreed to withhold it from broadcast pending Wigand's permission. 136 CBS broadcasted a version of the interview with Wigand's
identity obscured.137 Once Wigand had given testimony on the
record consistent with his interview, CBS broadcasted the interview with Wigand's identity made plain.' 38
Both the movie and the real-life record are ambiguous on
another key point: whether Bergman promised Wigand that CBS
would pay his legal fees in the event he was sued by Brown & Williamson for breach of confidence.1 39 Vanity Fair reported that a
discussion occurred, prompted by Wigand's counsel, but did not
state the outcome. 140 PBS Frontline reported only a negotiation

Because the lawsuit
wallace-getting-over-it.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm.
discussed here is hypothetical anyway, the analysis will benefit by borrowing
some facts from Hollywood.
THE INSIDER, supra note 54. These facts are consistent with the Vani135.
ty Fairreport, Brenner, supra note 49.
136. Brenner, supra note 49.
137. Id.
138. Id.
In The Insider, supra note 54, CBS counsel observed to 60 Minutes
139.
staff, "I'm told unusual promises were made to Wigand." Probably, she was
referring to this issue because it could mark a significant threshold in liability
exposure for tortious interference.
Brenner, supra note 49; accord Frontline: Smoke in the Eye (PBS
140.
transcript available at
1996),
2,
Apr.
broadcast
television
(quoting
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/smoke/smokescript.html
Daniel Schorr referring to "insistence of Wigand's lawyer that CBS pay for his
client's defense if airing the interview led to a lawsuit"). Another account said
CBS did promise to pay Wigand's legal fees. Paul Starr, What You Need to Beat
Goliath, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001), http://prospect.org/article/what-youneed-beat-goliath. A textbook in business law cited the Wall Street Journalfor
a report that CBS paid Wigand a $12,000 consulting fee and promised "full
indemnification." MARIANNE M. JENNINGS, BUSINESS: ITS LEGAL, ETHICAL,
AND GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT 315 (9th ed. 2010); see also infra note 143.
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over legal fees in the event of a libel suit. 14 1 Certainly CBS counsel was troubled by the prospect of any agreement.142 CBS might
have come around later, perhaps emboldened by Wigand's litigation privilege. Or the network might have reasoned that once Wigand's identity was public record, there was nothing left of the confidentiality agreement for the tobacco company to enforce.14 3 By
the time Wigand testified, CBS itself was taking a beating in the
press for its in-fighting over how to handle the story.144 In any
event, it is worthwhile in this analysis to consider the impact of a
hypothetical fee-indemnity agreement between CBS and Wigand.
The prospective-economic-advantage claim in Baer Bank
focused on the bank's relationships with its customers. 145 Private
and institutional consumers of financial services would see the
public dissemination of confidential records and conclude that
Baer Bank could not be trusted with their business, the bank reasoned.146 Baer Bank understandably declined to mention that revelation of questionable business practices in the Cayman Islands
might have also undermined consumer confidence. WikiLeaks
intended such impact, the bank alleged, pointing again to the website's provision of an avenue for anonymous leaking without regard for confidentiality agreements.' 47 Indeed, WikiLeaks boasts

141.
Smoke in the Eye: Anatomy ofa Decision,supranote 133.
142. Smoke in the Eye: Interview [with] Victor Kovner, PBS FRONTLINE,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/smoke/interviews/kovner.html
(last
visited Nov. 20, 2013).
143.
According to one report, CBS President Eric W. Ober arT ounced
"full indemnification" of Wigand after airing the interview in which he was
identified. Alicia C. Shepard, FightingBack, AM. JOURNALISM REV., Jan.-Feb.

1996, at 34, 39.
144.
Brenner, supra note 49.
145. See Complaint,supra note 65, T 55-59.
146. Id. T 56-58.
147. Id. 57. To date, there is no love lost between WikiLeaks and big
banks, which blocked donor funding for the organization. WikiLeaks explained:
"The most powerful players in the banking industry have shown themselves to
be a politicized arm of Washington. This collusion has occurred outside of any
judicial or administrative process. The reach of these companies is global and
violates the most basic principles of sovereignty."
Banking Blockade,
W1KILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/Banking-Blockade.html (last visited Oct. 24,
2013); see also Edward Wasserman, Blame Bankers for WikiLeaks' Demise,
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of its past publication of confidential reports that contributed to the
downfall of the Iceland-based bank, Kaupthing.14 8
Prospective economic advantage may be alleged in the tobacco case in a slightly different cast. Under a theory similar to
Baer Bank's, Brown & Williamson could have alleged that CBS
intended to jeopardize the manufacturer's future sales of cigarettes
to wholesalers and consumers. But the theory would put the tobacco company in the same untenable position as Baer Bank complaining of the revelation of its financial practices, arguing in essence that consumer ignorance is a business staple. The better interference argument in the tobacco case would shift focus from
confidentiality vis-A-vis customers to confidentiality vis-d-vis
competitors, predicating interference on the wrongful disclosure of
trade secrets.14 9 It is not clear that the Wigand tobacco case would
have supported the claim, because upon seeing documents 60
Minutes had obtained from tobacco manufacturer Philip Morris,
Wigand reportedly expressed surprise at how far Brown & Williamson lagged behind in research and development.1 50 But the
Philip Morris documents themselves had been leaked to CBS,' 5 ' so
one easily can imagine a leaker revealing to competitors proprietary product formulae or business methods. Those revelations may
PRESS OF ATLANTIC CITY, Nov. 18, 2011, at A15, available at 2011 WLNR

23974411.
148.
See, e.g., Simon Bowers, Icelandic Bank Kaupthing's Top Executives
Indicted Over Market Rigging, GUARDIAN
(Mar.
19,
2013),
http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2013/mar/19/kaupthing-executivesindicted-for-market-rigging?INTCMP=SRCH (describing the collapse of Kaupthing and prosecution of executives for fraud).
149. See, e.g., Carolina Bolado, Ex-Tea Marketer Accused of Leaking
Trade
Secrets,
LAw360
(Mar.
6,
2013,
8:34
PM),
http://www.1aw360.com/articles/421510/ex-tea-marketer-accused-of-leakingtrade-secrets (citing SereniGy Global Inc. v. Mendoza, No. 2013-08243-CA
(Fla. Cir. Ct. filed Mar. 6, 2013)) (reporting suit by tea and coffee maker against
ex-marketer for revealing maker's trade secrets, in addition to wooing customers); Business Contracts & Tortious Tortious Interference Claims in Texas,
MEYER
&
COLGROVE
(Oct.
24,
2012,
5:12
AM),
http://colegrovelaw.com/blog/business-contracts-tortious-interference-claims-intexas/ (listing among circumstances that may be tortious interference in Texas,
causing corporate employee to leak in violation of covenant).
150.
Brenner, supra note 49.
151.
Id.
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be alleged to interfere with a company's prospective economic
relations with consumers and investors.
At the outset in an interference claim, Baer Bank or Brown
& Williamson would have to prove that WikiLeaks or CBS interfered with a business relationship in existence or in reasonably
probable expectancy, and that the defendants had some cognizance
of the business relationship with which they are alleged to have
interfered. The proof is manageable. Both plaintiffs had existing
contracts for the sale of services or products, and both likely suffered some loss of business after the revelation of their secrets.
Nor should it be difficult for either plaintiff, as worldwide leaders
in their industries at the time, to pull together evidence of lost prospective business. Lost clients or lost prospects are more likely to
go to the quantum of damages than to the dispositive question of
liability. And insofar as causation is a question of fact, a plaintiff
with plausible evidence should be able to beat dispositive defensive motions to reach a jury.
The challenging elements of interference in the leaking
case are intentionality and impropriety, including the privilegeinverse of the latter, justification. Both defendants are well positioned to prevail on these elements. As to intent, the plaintiffs
probably can prove that CBS and WikiLeaks had knowledge to a
substantial certainty that their publications would result in lost
business. It makes sense that consumers informed of dangerous
tobacco additives would smoke less; that banking customers desirous of famous Swiss secrecy would be alienated by identity leaks;
and that investors in either case would be put off by revelations of
trade secrets.
As a court requires greater specificity of intent, the plaintiff's case weakens. CBS and WikiLeaks might be described aptly
as reckless or indifferent to the plight of their plaintiffs, but these
terms imply a passivity that falls short of intent to interfere. The
WikiLeaks mission is "to bring important news and information to
the public" and "to publish original source material alongside our
news stories so readers and historians alike can see evidence of the
truth."l 5 2 Similarly, CBS News presumably purports to publish in
accordance with contemporary ethical standards of journalism
152. About: What is WikiLeaks?, WIILEAKS, http://wikileaks.org/About.
html (last visited Dec. 11, 2013).
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concerning truth, objectivity, and news judgment.' 5 3 Thus, both
defendants conduct themselves in furtherance of freedom of information, democratic participation, and public education-not specifically the disruption of private business.
Nevertheless, plaintiffs may argue that defendants' journalistic motives are incidental to other objectives. CBS is a for-profit
business, and the exposed in-fighting over the Wigand story revealed an uncomfortable interplay between CBS News and CBS
executives. 154 Though allegations were purely speculative, based
on circumstances, critics pointed out that the same CBS executives
who were fearful of a Brown & Williamson lawsuit later made big
money upon a CBS merger with Westinghouse.' 5 5 A lawsuit
would have cut into profits if not killed the merger. Also, CBS
investor and CEO Larry Tisch was the father of Andrew Tisch, one
of the tobacco company CEOs whom Wigand accused of lying
when they swore before Congress in 1994 to their ignorance of the
addictive or carcinogenic properties of nicotine and cigarettes.156
Though the incentives for CBS executives seem to have been
aligned with Brown & Williamson's as to Wigand, the implication
is that CBS made decisions based on enhancing its financial worth,
whether or not at others' expense, rather than based on journalistic
ideals. A skeptic could have argued that Bergman and 60 Minutes
were no less self-serving.
For its part, WikiLeaks disavows profit motive,' 5 7 but deWhether
pends desperately on financial support via donations.'
CBS television or WikiLeaks online, scandal wins eyes and money. Baer Bank found purpose in WikiLeaks' own statement proffering an outlet for leakers, and WikiLeaks boasts of its injury
caused to business, however justifiable.1 59 Moreover, WikiLeaks
was accused of having a partisan agenda in publishing the video of

153.

See, e.g., Susan Paterno, The Lying Game, AM. JOURNALISM REV.,

May 1997, at 40, 43 (interviewing CBS correspondent Mike Wallace about centrality of truth in news operation).
154. Brenner, supra note 49.
155.
Id
156. Id
157. About: What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 152, § 1.3.
158. See Banking Blockade, supra note 147.
159. See About: What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 152, § 2.2.
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60
the Baghdad air strike under the title, "Collateral Murder."1
Though WikiLeaks purports not to edit,'61 it writes "news" stories
on selected content and headlines material based on potential impact.162 Thus, WikiLeaks publishes with an intent to further the
public welfare only arguably subordinate to an intent to interfere
with and injure commercial interests. Bambauer found this distinction crucial in distinguishing WikiLeaks war-diary publications
from The New York Times publication of the Pentagon Papers for
purposes of information policy.16 3
Were WikiLeaks a bank, or CBS a cigarette manufacturer,
it would fit the conventional paradigm of aggressive competitor
qua interfering defendant. But nowhere does interference require
that plaintiff and defendant be in direct competition. 164 "Indirect"
interference goes to impropriety rather than to intentionality.1 65
And a business model that earns revenue from schadenfreudel 66 is
no less liable for civil wrongs than a business that sells services or
products. Viewers who tuned in to watch Bill and Hillary Clinton

160.
See, e.g., The Colbert Report: Julian Assange Extended Interview
(Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 12, 2010), available at
http://www.colbertnation.com/the-colbert-report-videos/260785/april- 122010/exclusives---julian-assange-unedited-interview.
161. About: What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 152, § 1.4.
162. Id. § 1.2.
163.
Bambauer, supra note 24, at 34-35, 38-42; see also Jonathan Peters,
WikiLeaks Would Not Qualify to Claim Federal Reporter's Privilege in Any
Form, 63 FED. COMM. L.J. 667, 688 (2011) (concluding that for lack of journalistic function, WikiLeaks could not qualify as a journalist meriting protection
under any of the proposed federal shield laws).
164. Indeed, in the absence of competition, no competition privilege pertains. See 44B AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 30 (2007); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 767 (1979).
165. Sandra S. Baron, Hilary Lane, & David A. Schulz, Tortious Interference: The Limits of Common Law Liabilityfor Newsgathering, 4 WM. & MARY
BILL RTs. J. 1027, 1050 (1996) (concluding that the impropriety factor of proximity or remoteness would favor a media defendant).
166. See, e.g., Christopher Versace, 10 Stocks to Benefit from Hurricane
Sandy,
FORBES
(Oct.
29,
2012,
9:12
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2012/10/29/10-stocks-to-benefitfrom-hurricane-sandy/ (listing, among others, Facebook).
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on 60 Minutes after the 1992 Super Bowll 67 were looking for more
than just another celebrity profile. In other words, the worthiness
of the defendant's motives goes to impropriety, not to intentionality. Looking again at interference from the perspective of the defense, the tort provides an affirmative defense for the defendant
that acts in furtherance of its own economic interests-there is
nothing wrong with profit motive per se, which is the essence of a
competitive marketplace-but the scope of the affirmative defense
circles back to a test for impropriety in the defendant's furtherance
of its commercial interests.168
Thus, it is no surprise that the lynchpin of the interference
cases is impropriety, or lack of justification. The defendants' journalistic, profit-driven, or malicious motives come into play again
and may inure to defendants' advantage. Profit motive per se is
not improper, short of the boundary of social unacceptability.
Whereas multiplicity of motive might be sufficient to support the
plaintiffs case for intent, a single justified motive might negate
impropriety.169 Baron, Lane, and Schulz cited two cases in which
investigative reporters escaped liability for their journalistic endeavors.1 70 A body-shop owner failed to show that a broadcaster
bore a motive other than journalistic, such as might support an interference claim.17 1 And a second case involved none other than
Brown & Williamson versus CBS over an affiliate's reporting on
cigarettes.172 In what was principally a defamation case, the Seventh Circuit affirmed for the defendant on interference, finding that
the affiliate intended exclusively "to attract viewers," not to injure
the company.

60 Minutes: Governor & Mrs. Clinton (CBS television broadcast Jan.
167.
26, 1992), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504803_162-5756588710391709/hillarys-first-joint-interview-next-to-bill-in-92/.
See 44B AM. JUR. 2D Interference § 29; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
168.
TORTS § 773 (1979).

169.
170.
713 F.2d
1995)).
171.
172.
173.

See Baron, Lane, & Schulz, supra note 165, at 1048.
Id. at 1048 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson,
262 (7th Cir. 1983); Dulgarian v. Stone, 652 N.E.2d 603 (Mass.
Dulgarian,652 N.E.2d at 609.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 713 F.2d at 265-66.
Id.at 274.
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Analyzing the tobacco case, Baron, Lane, and Schulz in
1996 posited that newsgathering, as a public good, is nearly immune from interference liability.17 4 Impropriety on the one hand
considers social value, and from the defensive position, privilege
may arise in public interest. The logic of this position as to a news
media defendant remains viable and untested in the courts since
1996. Baron, Lane, and Schulz relied in part on courts' then extant
but waning inclination to rely on Branzburg v. Hayes'7 5 for the
proposition that newsgathering enjoys some First Amendment
privilege.176 It bears mention that the conventional wisdom on
Branzburgmade an about face in subsequent years, superseded by
the observation in hindsight that a Court plurality held journalists
subject to laws of general applicability,177 including the laws of
tort and contract.178 But it remains a stretch to conclude that
newsgathering is wrongful or improper in interference terms, short
of, say, an act of violence or physical intimidation, or at least economic coercion. However hard The Insider was on CBS, the
viewer still was left with an impression of Bergman as a hero in
journalistic and ethical terms for wanting to get Wigand's story
told.
Baron, Lane, and Schulz also ran the tobacco case through
the Restatement factors to test for impropriety, concluding that the

174.
Baron, Lane, & Schulz, supra note 165, at 1051-57; see also William
Bennett Turner, News Media Liability for "Tortious Interference" with a
Source's Nondisclosure Contract, COMM. LAW., Spring 1996, at 13, 15 (favoring unlikelihood of liability based on public interest, notwithstanding the First
Amendment).
175.
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
176. Baron, Lane, & Schulz, supra note 165, at 1053.
177.
See McKevitt v. Pallasch, 339 F.3d 530, 533 (7th Cir. 2003); see also
Daxton R. "Chip" Stewart & Anthony L. Fargo, Challenging Civil Contempt:
The Limits of Judicial Power in Cases Involving Journalists, 16 COMM. L. &
POL'Y 425, 431 (2011).

178.
See Anthony L. Fargo & Laurence B. Alexander, Testing the Boundaries of the FirstAmendment Press Clause: A Proposalfor Protectingthe Media
from Newsgathering Torts, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1093, 1101 (2009); Ben
Battles, Note, Terror, Tort, and the First Amendment: Hatfill v. New York
Times and Media Liability for Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 72
BROOK. L. REv. 237, 258-76 (2006) (reviewing the history of emotional distress
tort and proposing newsworthiness defense).
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element could not be proved. 179 Again, no change in interference
precedents since 1996 now casts doubt on the validity of that analysis. Probably the greatest vulnerability in the CBS position arises
from any promise by CBS to pay for Wigand's legal fees in case of
suit, especially in case of suit for breach of confidentiality. 8 0 Baron, Lane, and Schulz cited cases holding indemnity offers to be
improper inducements in furtherance of actionable interference.' 8'
However, as the authors observed, the defendants' dominant interests in those cases were business-competitive.1 82 If predominant
justification will serve to dispel impropriety, then the defendant
might prevail upon showing that journalism was its principal aim.
WikiLeaks has a good defense on impropriety, but a weaker case than CBS. WikiLeaks' absolutist position on the freedom
of information and its determination to post unedited, original content temper its claim to a conventional journalistic role." Without
the imprimatur of mainstream journalism, WikiLeaks can be painted as anarchic; thus, arguably contra public interest.' 84 Stripped of
justification, WikiLeaks would be more vulnerable to proof of
wrongful conduct than CBS would have been. Baer Bank asserted
that WikiLeaks' revelations of private banking information, identifying specific customers and their financial data, violated banking
regulations.18 5 The regulations bind only bankers, but Baer Bank
made a greater point: WikiLeaks' revelations were wrongful, or

179.
Baron, Lane, & Schulz, supra note 165, at 1043-51.
180.
See id.at 1045; Turner, supra note 174, at 15.
181.
Baron, Lane, & Schulz, supra note 165, at 1044.
182. Id. at 1045.
183.
See, e.g., Paivikki Karhula, What is the Effect of WikiLeaks for Freedom of Information?, IFLA, http://www.ifla.org/publications/what-is-the-effectof-wikileaks-for-freedom-of-information (last updated Oct. 5, 2012) (describing
how WikiLeaks' sometimes-absolutist position on free flow of information
without principled gatekeeping has alienated civil rights supporters and might
precipitate more secrecy in society rather than less).
184. See, e.g., Giorel Curran & Morgan Gibson, WikiLeaks, Anarchism
and Technologies of Dissent, 45 ANTIPODE 294, 307-08 (2012), available at
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8330.2012.01009.x/pdf (analyzing characteristics of WikiLeaks' conduct and enterprise that do not fit a
template of anarchism).
185.
Complaint, supra note 65, 34.
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improper, even if not illegal per se. 186 The claim depends on a lenient interpretation of impropriety as socially unacceptable conduct or a violation of business ethics or custom. The application of
such norms to a financial institution or banker who happens not to
have received the information in an official capacity seems within
the scope of the rule. But extension of professional norms from
within any specialized field-be it banking, journalism, medicine,
or another-to any member of the general public, which WikiLeaks might as well be, seems a stretch too far.
4.

Theory of Associative Liability

In a related vein, Baer Bank asserted that WikiLeaks became a joint tortfeasor with Baer Bank's former employee because
WikiLeaks maintained its postings even with actual knowledge
that they were acquired in violation of law. The alleged role is a
civil equivalent to accessory-after-the-fact and falls within the aiding-and-abetting scope of section 876. The difficulty is that violation of banking or consumer-privacy laws is a statutory wrong, not
a common-law tort, so common-law associative liability probably
does not pertain unless preserved by the statute.1 87 Still, the theory
bolsters Baer Bank's allegation that WikiLeaks was complicit in
the leaker's wrong, thus going to impropriety in the WikiLeaks
case.
The better joint-liability theory would link WikiLeaks or
CBS directly with tortious conduct by the leaker. Subsequent
analyses will address associative liability, each in its scope; here is
the possibility of aiding and abetting the leaker's own tortious interference. The case against CBS on this theory is difficult: the
underlying case against Wigand for interference presents problems
similar to those as against CBS for interference, namely a lack of
evidence that Wigand specifically intended to interfere with Brown
186. This theory is explained in greater detail as a possible predicate impropriety for the unfair competition claim, discussed infra Part II.B.
187. E.g., MicroStrategy, Inc. v. Bus. Objects, S.A., 429 F.3d 1344, 136263 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (litigating Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act). But see
Saunders v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 438, 445-46 (Ct. App. 1994) (authorizing aiding-and-abetting and conspiracy claims for unfair business practices
and interference without separate consideration, despite California Uniform
Trade Secrets Act).
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& Williamson's sales contracts or investor confidence. Ill will
toward the company does not suffice as intent to interfere. In fact,
Bergman might have sparked Wigand's willingness to violate his
confidentiality agreement, and then only for public-interest reasons. An aiding-and-abetting case against CBS would have to pile
inference upon inference.
The case for aiding and abetting interference is much better
against WikiLeaks. Leaker Elmer was embroiled in a raging dispute against his former employer before he came into contact with
WikiLeaks. In the recitation of the facts in the Baer Bank complaint, the bank alleged that Elmer was under investigation by authorities for terroristic threats against the bank and its employIf those allegations are true, then it is a short hop to conees.
clude that Elmer sought to disrupt the bank's relationships with the
clients whose identities Elmer sought to divulge. The divulgence
easily constitutes impropriety. And even after the bank's counsel
laid out Elmer's wrongdoing for WikiLeaks, the publisher continued to allow itself to serve as an instrument to Elmer's ends. WikiLeaks cannot disclaim the knowledge that aiding and abetting requires.
5.

Defense Theories, Including Free Speech and Anti-SLAPP

A number of affirmative defenses in the common-law interference tort may be tried on tobacco or WikiLeaks facts, but insofar as any pertain, they are duplicative of justification based on
journalistic purpose. Though both defendants may claim public
interest, neither case comprises a government defendant or a defendant petitioning government. Neither defendant was competing
in business with its plaintiff, and the privileges to advance a defendant's own interests are mitigated by, and duplicative of, impropriety anyway. Protection of a third party or the provision of
good-faith counsel respectively requires a specific party to whom a
right of protection is owed or requester to whom an opinion is given. Broad public-health, safety, or accountability arguments do not
fit, and the privileges for persons obligated by organization or employer do not apply.

188.

Complaint, supra note 65, J 21-22.
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Debated and unresolved is the impact of the freedom of expression in interference cases. Ostensibly, the First Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution affords no particular right to gather the
news.
Yet, at times, the U.S. Supreme Court has emphasized the
importance of news media-"freedom of the press," which is textually explicit in the First Amendment-and gone so far as to void
proscriptions that would silence the press.1 90 In cases in which the
Court extended the First Amendment as a viable affirmative defense against tort liability for defamation or invasion of privacy by
false light, the Court has characterized the defendants as "media"
defendants, though the import of the characterization is debated.191
Consequently, the online re-publisher has no more rights
than a member of the general public, which is not to deny that a republisher's mass media status puts a thumb on the scale for the
defense. CBS producers in the tobacco case surely believed that,
as investigative journalists and members of the press, they were
entitled to more latitude vis-A-vis Brown & Williamson than might
be afforded a competitor in the tobacco business. WikiLeaks similarly asserts journalistic ideals:
Publishing improves transparency, and this transparency creates a better society for all people. Better scrutiny leads to reduced corruption and stronger
democracies in all society's institutions, including
government, corporations and other organisations.
A healthy, vibrant and inquisitive journalistic media
plays a vital role in achieving these goals. We are

part of that media.192
When Baron, Lane, and Schulz considered the First
Amendment question in the tobacco case in 1996, they concluded
that the common-law analysis, especially on impropriety, tended

189. See Fargo & Alexander, supranote 178, at 1101.
190. See id. at 1101-02 (mentioning taxation aimed at press).
191.
See generally Francis M. Dougherty, Annotation, Defamation: Application of New York Times and Related Standards to Nonmedia Defendants, 38
A.L.R.4TH 1114, § 2[a] (1985) (summarizing incidence of courts' application of
constitutional standards in defamation cases against non-media defendants).
192. About: What is WikiLeaks?, supra note 152, § 1.3.
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prophylactically to preclude the First Amendment question,193 and
that insofar as it did not, a winning First Amendment claim might
be found in the right to petition or the right of access.1 94 The first
conclusion-that common law incorporates free-expression
norms-surely is correct, as reiterated in the impropriety analysis
above.
The second conclusion-that First Amendment protection
might be found in the rights of petition or access-looks decidedly
less viable now than it might have in 1996. Whistleblowers took a
big hit in the First-Amendment-in-employment decision Garcetti v.
Ceballos, in which the Supreme Court fixed whistleblower protection in the realm of statutory rather than constitutional protection.195 Garcetti involved whistleblowing on perceived misconduct in the public sector,' 96 so it should inspire no confidence to
the whistleblower in the private sector, where employee discipline
is not state action. Garcetti also involved the freedom of expression,197 not explicitly the freedom of petition; the narrower latter
has always required petition to government and excluded publication in the private sphere.198 Insofar as mass media republication
of misfeasance is concerned, common-law defamation defenses,
each of uncertain constitutional provenance, come to mind: the
fair report privilege and the neutral reportage privilege.199 But the
fair report privilege again applies only to reports of content on the
official record, which private papers are not. 200 And the neutral
reportage privilege-even assuming its various technical elements
could be met, including responsible source, public-figure plaintiff,

193.
Accord Turner, supra note 174, at 15.
194.
Baron, Lane, & Schulz, supra note 165, at 1053-57.
547 U.S. 410, 425-26 (2006).
195.
196.
Id. at 413. See generally Geoffrey R. Stone, WikiLeaks and the First
Amendment, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 477, 481-86 (2012) (describing the First
Amendment in context of leaking by public employee).
197.
Garcetti,547 U.S. at 413.
198.
U.S. CONsT. amend. I (stating, in part, "to petition the Government");
see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 208 F.3d 885, 891
(10th Cir. 2000).
199. See generally Peltz, supra note 3, at 725-34 (summarizing multistate
norms of fair report privilege and neutral reportage doctrine).
200.
See 50 AM. JUR. 2D Libel and Slander § 300 (2006).
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newsworthy subject matter, and disinterested coverage 20 '-has had
a mixed reception in the courts. 202 The right to petition protects
only the whistleblower who reports to public authorities; and the
whistleblower had best already have exited the employment.
The right to petition might come into play in a manner not
contemplated by Baron, Lane, and Schulz, through statutes such as
California's anti-SLAPP (anti-strategic lawsuit against public participation) law. 20 3 Anti-SLAPP may amplify the First Amendment
defense against any tort claim predicated on the defendant's expression, regardless of whether the expression is alleged to be
false.204 The statute authorizes a defendant to file "a special motion to strike," asserting that a private plaintiffs cause of action is
based on defendant's furtherance of the freedom of speech or of
petition "in connection with a public issue," including public
statements "in connection with an issue of public interest." 205 The
plaintiff then must establish a probability of success on the merits
to overcome the motion.206 Upon plaintiffs showing, the antiSLAPP motion forces the court to examine whether the defendant's expression is constitutionally protected, and if so, to dismiss.207 The plaintiffs subjective motive in filing the lawsuit is
immaterial to the analysis.20 Nevertheless, anti-SLAPP is derived
from the jurisprudence of the right to petition, and the analysis
sometimes bleeds into an inquiry of whether the gravamen of the
litigation (a petition itself) is a legitimate pursuit of legal interest,
or whether the gravamen of the litigation (a "sham" in petition par-

201.
See Jennifer J. Ho, Annotation, Libel and Slander: Construction and
Application of the Neutral Reportage Privilege, 13 A.L.R.6TH1I 11, §§ 15-25
(2006).
202. See id §§ 3-4.
203.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004 & Supp. 2013).
204. See generally 123 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D EstablishingProof
in FilingofAnti-SLAPP Motion § 1 (2011) (defining and explaining the purpose
of strategic lawsuits against public participation).
205.
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1), (e).
206. Id. § 425.16(b)(1).
207. See Huntingdon Life Scis., Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty
USA, Inc., 29 Cal. Rptr. 3d 521, 535 (Ct. App. 2005) (quoting Scott v.
Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 9 Cal. Rptr. 3d 242, 253 (Ct. App. 2004)).
208. Navellier v. Sletten, 52 P.3d 703, 708 (Cal. 2002).
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lance) is in hindrance of the defendant's expressive freedom. 209
Thus, for example, a biopharmaceutical firm overcame an antiSLAPP motion in pursuing injunctive relief against an animalrights organization for conspiracy and trespass because the organization's online publication of firm employees' home addresses, in
context, was a true threat or advocacy of violence unprotected by
the First Amendment. 210 In contrast, in Braun v. Chronicle Publishing, the court struck defamation claims against a newspaper
that reported on investigations into alleged misfeasance in the administration of a public-university medical program after determining that the reports were protected speech under statutory privilege
for reporting on official proceedings. 21 1
Like whistleblowing, access has been confined largely to
the realm of common law and code. 212 The right of courthouse
access to criminal trials, established since 1980 in the Richmond
Newspapers line of cases, 2 13 has shown no expansion-in the Supreme Court at least-beyond that anomalous context. 2 14 To the
contrary, the Court found no constitutional access right that would
elevate equal-protection scrutiny when California statutorily favored non-commercial over commercial requesters of police rec-

209.
See, e.g., Martinez v. Metabolife Int'l, Inc., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 494, 499
2003)
(finding gravamen, or "principal thrust," to favor plaintiffs in
(Ct. App.
product liability suit despite defendant's resort to anti-SLAPP upon expressive
interest in product advertising and labeling). Compare 123 AM. JUR. PROOF OF
FACTS 3D Establishing Proofin Filing ofAnti-SLAPP Motion § 3 ("Disguise of
SLAPP action"), with id. § 12 ("sham exception").
210.
Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics, Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal
Cruelty USA, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 39 (Ct. App. 2006).
211.
61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 67 (Ct. App. 1997).
212.
See generally RICHARD J. PELTZ-STEELE, THE LAW OF ACCESS TO
GOVERNMENT 3-5, 125-30 (2012) (overviewing common-law history and contemporary statutory system of freedom of information).
213.
See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986); PressEnter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984); Globe Newspaper Co. v.
Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980).
214.
See Kathleen K. Miller, Note, Do Democracies Die Behind Closed
Doors? Finding a FirstAmendment Right ofAccess to Deportation Hearingsby
Reevaluating the Richmond Newspapers Test, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 646,
650-52 (2004).
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ords. 2 15 And more recently, the Court found no fundamental interest in access that would support a privileges-and-immunities claim
against a state's favoritism of its own residents in FOIA requests. 216 The right of access is ill-poised to protect a leaker or republisher against direct state action, never mind the indirect state
action implicated in the adjudication of civil liability.
Rather, the best argument for a First Amendment defense to
interference arises from analogy to other torts. The risk of "an
end-run" around the free-expression privilege of New York Times
v. Sullivan in defamation actions217 prompted the Supreme Court to
extend Sullivan's logic to invasion of privacy by false light, in
Time, Inc. v. Hill,2 18 and to intentional infliction of emotional distress, in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell.2 19 Baron, Lane, and
Schulz quoted the Seventh Circuit's prediction that Illinois courts
would do likewise in tortious interference: were the defense not
extended, the court reasoned, any corporate defamation claim
could be dressed in interference clothing to subvert constitutional
safeguards. 220 The unprosecuted defamation would serve as the
otherwise tortious conduct in support of the impropriety analysis in
the interference action. The Seventh Circuit's logic remains
sound. Indeed, in a dispute between a developer and a homebuyer,
a district court of appeals in California applied the First Amendment to an interference claim and expressly rejected the plaintiffs
assertion that the First Amendment would protect only a media
defendant.2 2 '
However, the proposition has been no better tested in the
years since Baron, Lane, and Schulz wrote. Additionally, there is a
convincing contrary argument. Courts have struggled with, but
215. L.A. Police Dep't v. United Reporting Publ'g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 3435, 40 (1999).
216. McBurney v. Young, 133 S. Ct. 1709, 1718-19 (2013).
217. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 522
(4th Cir. 1999); see also Fargo & Alexander, supranote 178, at 1112.
218. 385 U.S. 374, 389-91 (1967).
219. 485 U.S. 46, 50-56 (1988).
220. Baron, Lane, & Schulz, supra note 165, at 1051-52 (quoting Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262, 273-74 (7th Cir.
1983)).
221.
Paradise Hills Assocs. v. Procel, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 514, 521-22 (Ct.
App. 1991).
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often rejected, a formal First Amendment defense in the general
tort of negligence. For example, plaintiffs in a series of cases alleged that the negligent media depiction of violent or dangerous
conduct in disregard of the risk of imitation by the message recipient caused injury to either the message recipient himself or a third
party.22 2 Whether the First Amendment should burden liability,
perhaps by proof of recklessness rather than mere negligence,2 2 3
depends on whether media torts or conventional careless conduct
offer the appropriate analogy to these cases. From the media defendant's perspective, the alleged actionable conduct is merely
careless expression, not, for example, careless construction of a
bridge, so the First Amendment should pertain. But from the
plaintiffs perspective, physical injury, not the amorphous loss of
reputation or privacy, is the actionable damage, so the First
Amendment should have no bearing.
By extension, interference looks a bit like one, general negligence, and a bit like the other, media tort. On the one hand, the
requisite culpability for interference, out of the gate, is a demanding rendition of intent, requiring at least knowledge with substantial certainty in consequences. That requirement affords far more
confidence in a court's declaration of civil wrong, and, inversely,
less risk of a chilling effect on speech than when liability is predicated upon mere carelessness. Indeed, the proper analogy to interference in physical torts is not negligence at all, but battery, where
that confidence in adjudication allows the imposition of liability
upon mere offensive contact without even the degree of physical
injury required in negligence.224 On the other hand, the injury
222.
See Andrew B. Sims, Tort Liability for Physical Injuries Allegedly
Resultingfrom Media Speech: A Comprehensive FirstAmendment Approach, 34
ARIz. L. REV. 231, 243-45 (1992).

See generally 20 CAUSES OF ACTION 2D

Cause of Action Against Producer, Artist, Publisher or Author for Violence
Incited by a Movie, Song or Book (2002) (compiling theories of liability against
media purveyors for alleged incitement of violence).
See S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Re223.
calibratingthe Cost of Harm Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 1159, 1220-21 (2000).
Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
224.

§ 18(1) (1965) (stating

that a person is liable for battery if he "intend[s] to cause a harmful or offensive
contact" with another person and such offensive contact results), with 57A AM.
JUR. 2D Negligence § 131 (2004) (requiring some "identifiable damage" before a
negligent act becomes actionable).
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complained of in interference is not physical, not even contact, but
merely economic loss. The economic-loss rule of negligence embodies the common law's aversion to liability upon too low a culpability threshold, lest civil wrongs overrun the chain of causation
and escape the bonds of corrective justice. 225 If liability is to be
imposed upon so low a threshold of injury, then arguably the First
Amendment should have something to say about that.
Therefore, in its intent analysis as well as its impropriety
analysis, the common law prophylactically incorporates freeexpression concerns. The question thus arises: if the First
Amendment pertains in interference, what does it do? In defamation, public-official or public-figure plaintiffs are charged with
proving falsity, and the requisite fault standard as to proof of falsity is elevated from the usual default of negligence to actual malice,
defined as knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard as to truth or
falsity. 226 The same elevated burden of proof pertains to plaintiffs
in false light upon "matters of public interest."227 Interference already comes with an elevated fault standard; the requirement that a
plaintiff prove intent both of action and consequence exceeds the
actual-malice burden.
The real difficulty arises in connection with falsity, and it is
the same difficulty that arises in considering how the First
Amendment affects invasion of privacy by disclosure, rather than
false light.2 28 In tortious disclosure, the very truth of the matter
disclosed is a condition of the injury; were the disclosure false,
there would be no invasion of privacy. This conundrum has
225.
See 6 PHILIP L. BRUNER & PATRICK J. O'CONNOR, JR., BRUNER AND
O'CONNOR ON CONSTRUCTION LAW § 19:10 (2012).

226. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 334 (1974). Moreover,
fault as to falsity must be proved to a burden of clear and convincing evidence,
more than the default tort burden of preponderance. Id. at 342.
227. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 (1975) (citing Time,
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 387-88 (1967)).
228. See id. at 490-91 (reserving the question by limiting holding for media defendant to situation in which information was already disclosed in public
records). See generally 123 AM. JUR. TRIALS Invasion of Privacy by Public
Disclosure of PrivateFacts § 8 (2012) (overviewing the First Amendment as a
defense to the tort of invasion of privacy); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652D (1977) (providing a special note on the possible constitutional limitations on liability for truthful disclosure of private information of a private citizen).
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prompted a stalwart (if waning) class of First Amendment absolutists to argue that invasion of privacy by disclosure is, or anyway
should be, unconstitutional. 229 Though the Supreme Court has not
confronted this argument head on, 2 3 lower courts have been approving of common-law invasion of privacy by disclosure, 2 3' suggesting that one day the absolutists might be bested. In interference, when the alleged interference is accomplished by expression,
the expression may contain truth or falsity. It was the latter situation that prompted the Seventh Circuit to predict Illinois's extension of the First Amendment to interference, for fear that every
defamation case could be recast as an interference case. 232 Likewise, the Supreme Court's extension of the First Amendment in
IIED was deceptively simple because Hustler involved an ad parody that did not even purport to be true, instead deriving its humor
from its absurd extreme of falsity.23 3
What, then, of allegedly interfering expression that is true?
The common law partly anticipates this scenario in its affirmative
229.
See, e.g., Peter B. Edelman, Free Press v. Privacy: Haunted by the
Ghost ofJustice Black, 68 TEX. L. REV. 195, 1211-18 (1990) (describing competing approaches of absolutism and balancing to the problem of free speech and
privacy in High Court jurisprudence and noting the legacy of that competition in
contemporary doctrine). But cf Mark Fenster, Disclosure'sEffects: WikiLeaks
and Transparency, 97 IOWA L. REV. 753, 805-07 (2012) (concluding his analysis of WikiLeaks in the context of the transparency theory with doubt about the
efficacy of WikiLeaks idealism); Roy Peled, WikiLeaks as a Transparency
Hard-Case, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 64, 76 (2012) ("Merely dumping masses of
information does not do much. It was an error to think it would."); Christina E.
Wells, Contextualizing Disclosure's Effects: WikiLeaks, Balancing, and the
FirstAmendment, 97 IOWA L. REV. BULL. 51, 62-63 (2012) (expanding on Fenster's thesis).
230.
See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 529 (2001) (observing
"this Court's repeated refusal to answer categorically whether truthful publication may ever be punished consistent with the First Amendment").
231.
See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1128-29 (9th Cir. 1975);
Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 767 (Ct. App. 1983). The
High Court, meanwhile, has been solicitous of statutory privacy claims. See,
e.g., Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160, 172-75
(2004) (construing federal Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)
(2002)).
232.
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Jacobson, 713 F.2d 262,
273-74 (7th Cir. 1983).
233.
See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56-57 (1988).
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defense based on truthful information and good-faith counsel. But
the defense is confined to a response to specific request and does
not contemplate mass media publication. The absolutist or near
absolutist may argue that when interference is accomplished by
truthful expression, especially by a media defendant, the First
Amendment flatly precludes liability. But that argument seems as
unpromising as the argument to erase the common law of tortious
disclosure.
Grounds for the extreme of First Amendment inapplicability can be found in the rule of Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,234
which accords with the Branzburgapproach. In Cohen, the plaintiff claimed promissory estoppel, which the Court allowed to overcome a free-speech argument by a media defendant that had broken a promise of confidentiality to a source. 2 35 On the one hand,
contract law did not undergo the auspicious development in the
civil rights era that tort law did, so tort law may be said to implicate the civil rights of the defendant to a greater degree, necessitating the interposition of free expression. On the other hand, Cohen,
like Branzburg before it in rejecting a journalist's bid to resist a
grand jury subpoena,236 stands for the proposition that media are
not exempt from the operation of generally applicable law, whether
criminal or civil, common law or statutory. 237 Thus, tortious interference may be viewed as analogous to promissory estoppel.
Many writers have opined on the problem of newsgathering
activities and tort liability.238 A viable middle ground was mapped
by a separate opinion by the Supreme Court in Bartnicki v. Vopper.239 Bartnicki involved a test of the rule, a corollary of the rule
against prior restraints, that absent a state interest of the highest
order, a defendant may not be punished for the republication of
truthful information that the defendant lawfully obtained. 24 In
234. 501 U.S. 663, 671-72 (1991).
235. Id. at 671.
236. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 682-83, 685 (1972).
237.
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 669.
238. The literature was recently compiled by Fargo & Alexander, supra
note 178, at 1133-41.
239.
532 U.S. 514 (2001).
240. Id. at 527-28 (citing Smith v. Daily Mail Publ'g Co., 443 U.S. 97,
103 (1979)); see also Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 545 (1989) (White, J.,
dissenting) (citing Smith for the same proposition). See generally Richard J.
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Bartnicki, a radio station broadcasted a telephone conversation that
had been recorded in violation of wiretap law and delivered anonymously, 24 1 much as if Bergman had published the raw Philip
Morris documents that were probably copied in breach of a confidence and then dropped at his doorstep. The Court balanced the
government's interests in the wiretap law against the public concern in the subject of the broadcast conversation, regarding a highprofile labor dispute, and the rule for truthful disclosures won out,
protecting the defendant. 242 The Court reserved the question of
whether the balance would produce the same result were the
broadcast prohibition applied to "disclosures of trade secrets or
domestic gossip or other information of purely private concern." 243
The better view might have been the Third Circuit's below
and Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, even though they reached
different conclusions. The Court agreed with both the Third Circuit244 and the dissent 245 that the wiretap law is a content-neutral
law of general applicability, "justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech," because the republication prohibition
is triggered by the illegal interception of the conversation rather
than the content. 246 Content-neutral laws incidentally burdening
speech are tested by intermediate scrutiny, which the Third Circuit
and the Chief Justice favored.2 4 7 The Third Circuit concluded that
application of the broadcast prohibition to the radio station when it
had done nothing unlawful was not sufficiently narrowly tailored
to satisfy intermediate scrutiny in furtherance of the government's
important objective in deterring unauthorized interceptions in the
first place. 248 The Chief Justice generalized the government interPeltz-Steele, The New American Privacy, 44 GEO. J. INT'L L. 365, 391-94

(2013) (summarizing the First Amendment rule protecting republication of
truthful information lawfully obtained).
241.

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 517-19.

242.

Id. at 533-34.

243.

Id. at 533.

244.
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 200 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 1999), aff'd 532 U.S.
514 (2001).
245.
Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
246.
Id. at 521, 526 (quoting Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
791 (1989)).
247.

Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 545 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Bartnicki,

200 F.3d at 123.
248.
Bartnicki, 200 F.3d at 129.
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est to privacy more broadly, consistently with the common law,
and would have reached the opposite conclusion, finding a justifiable link between penalties on republications and deterrence of interceptions. 249 The Chief Justice objected to what he viewed as the
majority's elevation of scrutiny to strict based on the matter of

public concern.250
On balance, intermediate scrutiny is an appealing middle
ground to test regulations of conduct that incidentally burden
speech as applied. The approach is consistent with the origin of
content-neutral analysis in the expressive conduct case United
States v. O'Brien.25 1 Chemerinsky championed intermediate scrutiny as a corrective to the laissez-faire approach modeled by Cohen.252 Viewed from the opposite extreme, intermediate scrutiny
allows for the accommodation of state tort law without the radical
federalization of the Sullivan doctrine, the rigidity of which is
proving regrettable in retrospect. 253
Applying heightened scrutiny to the cases at hand, tortious
interference surely serves a substantial government interest in
compensating civil wrongs and policing fairness in the marketplace. Just as the common law generally is prophylactically protective of free speech, the impropriety element is largely duplicative of the narrow tailoring analysis of intermediate scrutiny. Perhaps to comport with free-speech norms and accommodate the
First Amendment's aversion to vagueness and overbreadth,2 54 the
impropriety standard should be limited to otherwise tortious or
criminal conduct, as some jurisdictions limit it anyway in prospective-relations cases. In any event, this middle-ground model of
First Amendment application is roughly co-extensive with the justification defense, a doctrinal convenience to be embraced by the
doctrine of constitutional avoidance.
Bartnicki,532 U.S. at 551-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
249.
250. Id. at 544 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
251.
391 U.S. 367 (1968).
252. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protect the Press: A FirstAmendment Standard
for Safeguarding Aggressive Newsgathering, 33 U. RICH. L. REv. 1143, 114445 (2000).
253. See Peltz-Steele, supra note 240, at 384-91.
254. For example, Baron, Lane, and Schulz, supra note 165, at 1066, were
troubled by inconsistencies in tortious interference liability from a First
Amendment vagueness standpoint.
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Thus, in both the tobacco and WikiLeaks cases, the role of
the First Amendment is either side's to argue. In the current climate of First Amendment jurisprudence, a free-expression claim
resting on the Richmond Newspapers right of access or on the right
to petition seems unpromising. If tortious interference follows in
the defamation mold, then the defendants may predicate a defense
on extension of the Sullivan doctrine, and even argue a complete
defense based on truth.25 5 Plaintiffs may argue the immateriality
of free speech per Cohen and the public concern in smokers' health
and financial service practices per Bartnicki. An intermediatescrutiny approach allows argument either way on the application of
the civil liability rule in context, and the question is likely to follow the analysis on impropriety.
Perhaps importantly, the disclosures of customer data in
Baer Bank could force the case in favor of the plaintiff. The public
interest in specific customers' identities and financial particulars is
minimal, and the government interest is at its zenith with respect to
personal privacy protection. Whether in a threshold publicconcern analysis per Bartnicki or an intermediate-scrutiny analysis
per the Bartnicki dissent, WikiLeaks might for those data be hoisted by its own absolutist petard.
Defendants have a much improved chance of success in a
state such as California with a strong anti-SLAPP law, for their
business models are at least in part traditional free-speech enterprises, even if they also are profit-driven or reckless. Certainly
defendants look more like the media defendants in Braun than like
angry commercial rivals. But WikiLeaks perhaps more than staid
CBS News also looks like the animal-rights activists in the case of
the biopharmaceutical firm. WikiLeaks is at once heroic pamphleteer of the electronic age and anarchic scofflaw of the online
frontier. And to the skeptic, considering the internal machinations
of CBS executives and whatever the subjective intentions of producer Bergman, perhaps CBS too is no better than the seditious
In a Sullivan mold, however, some corporate plaintiffs, if not big
255.
banks or big tobacco, might succeed in arguing that they are not public figures,
so the First Amendment does not pertain. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 756-57, 763 (1985) (finding implicitly
that plaintiff corporation was a private figure, thereby not triggering constitutional defamation standards).
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agitator. In sum, tortious-interference liability for the media defendants cannot be ruled out.
6.

Interference Liability Exposure in Sum

In interference with contract or prospective economic relations, plaintiffs probably cannot show impropriety, the keystone
element of these torts. On the flip side of the same coin, defendants bear a good chance of showing justification, or lack of impropriety, whether in common law or constitutional law. CBS's journalistic motives, means, and objectives probably are sufficiently
disconnected from its position as a corporate enterprise to show a
lack of impropriety in its republication of tobacco company secrets
on 60 Minutes. Even WikiLeaks' purported devotion to journalistic mission, which critics say is belied in practice, probably is
sufficient to prevail similarly on the impropriety analysis. In each
case, public interest-in understanding the hazards of smoking, or
in the role of transnational banks in the financial crisis-pushes the
balance in the defendant's favor.
But the defense position weakens the more the plaintiff is
able to portray the defendant as in league with the leaker, or original publisher. In the tobacco case, counsel for leaker Wigand
asked CBS to pay his legal fees in the event he were sued by his
former employer. The record is unclear, but CBS probably balked.
Meanwhile, internal strife at CBS between management and the
news division invited allegations that CBS was more interested in
deriving market share from tobacco company misery than in protecting the public welfare. A staid journalistic enterprise, CBS
might have been able to weather these circumstances. But they
demonstrate that interference liability may indeed lurk in the shadows for the media defendant that associates too closely with a vulnerable source, or that allows its journalistic ideals to be overwhelmed by its business agenda.
B.

Unfair-CompetitionLaw

Baer Bank complained against WikiLeaks for violation of
California's unfair-competition law ("UCL"),256 or commonly,
unfair business practices. The bank predicated its UCL claim on
256.

Complaint, supra note 65,

32-41.
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the publication of proprietary bank records that included confidential customer data, asserting furthermore that publication "constitutes an infringement of [the bank's] rights and constitutes a violation of the applicable Swiss and Cayman Islands banking and consumer protection laws, as well as California state privacy rights
and laws." 257 The bank claimed reputational damage and aliena- - 258
tion of customers as injury.
1. Unfair Business Practice, Associative Liability, and
Causation
The California UCL generously authorizes state officials or
any private party with standing to seek injunction of "unfair competition," defined as "any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business
act or practice." 259 Whether the defendant's act is a "business" act
is a question of fact with little or no statutory guidance, 26 0 though
the term in California law is likely to be construed broadly in comportment with the purpose of the act, 26 1 "the right of the public to
Id. 27, 32-34.
257.
Id. T 35; cf All Things Considered:Bloomberg News Apologizes for
258.
Tracking Subscribers (National Public Radio broadcast May 13, 2013), available at http://www.npr.org/2013/05/13/183715000/bloomberg-news-apologizesfor-tracking-subscribers (demonstrating alienation in business community for
misuse of confidential client information).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17204 (West 2008 & Supp.
259.
2013). California also has a Consumer Legal Remedies Act, codified at CAL.
ClV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013), but it focuses on consumer transactions. Before 2004, the unfair-competition law authorized private
attorney-general actions without a demonstration of injury-in-fact to the plaintiff. A ballot proposition in California in 2004 reined in the UCL by limiting
private causes of action to injured plaintiffs, though the standard is applied leniently, and in some cases by compelling plaintiffs to meet class certification
standards. STEPHEN J. NEWMAN ET AL., STROOCK & STROOCK & LAVAN LLP,
2013 ANNUAL OVERVIEW OF CALIFORNIA'S UNFAIR COMPETITION LAW AND

CONSUMER

LEGAL

REMEDIES

ACT

4

(2013),

available

at

http://www.stroock.com/SiteFiles/Publ321.pdf.
260.

See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 259, at 2.

Magdaleno v. Indymac Bancorp, Inc., 853 F. Supp. 2d 983, 996 (E.D.
261.
Cal. 2011) ("The UCL is broad in scope, embracing anything that can properly
be called a business practice and that at the same time is forbidden by law."
(quoting People ex rel. Gallegos v. Pac. Lumber Co., 70 Cal. Rptr. 3d 501, 509
(Ct. App. 2008))).
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protection from fraud and deceit," or "any act denounced by [the
,,212
The UCL does not require that the plaintiff and defendCode].
ant are business competitors with each other; fair competition or
public protection is key.2 63 "Unlawful" is also interpreted broadly
to include federal and state statutes and regulations, local ordinances, professional standards, and rules of case law and common
law. 264 An "unfair" act need not be proscribed by law and ma
simply be the violation of the spirit of law, as with antitrust law. 2 5
"Unfair [business practices] are those that 'offend[] an established
public policy' or are 'immoral, unethical, oppressive,
unscrupu266
lous, or substantially injurious to consumers."'
However, the breadth of the law, even in California, must
not be overstated.2 6 7 Underlying violations of law or policy must
be "tethered to some legislatively declared policy or proof of some
actual or threatened impact on competition." 268 Conjoining the
elements of "business" and "unlawful," some California courts
have limited the liability scope to defendants engaged in "business" within the meaning of the underlying law.269 A challenging
problem arises when there is such a mismatch between the scope
of the underlying law and the identity or conduct of the defendant.
The problem would have been well exemplified by Claridge v.
RockYou, Inc.,270 had the court not avoided the question. In
Claridge,a computer user sued a software developer under various
theories, including the UCL, claiming that the developer failed to
sufficiently safeguard the plaintiffs personally identifying infor262.
Payne v. United Cal. Bank, 100 Cal. Rptr. 672, 676 (Ct. App. 1972).
263.
Ariz. Cartridge Remfrs. Ass'n v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 421 F.3d 981,
986 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods
Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 667 (Cal. 1983)).
264.

NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 259, at 14-15.

265.
See Cel-Tech Commc'ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 973 P.2d
527, 544 (Cal. 1999).
266.
Claridge v. RockYou, Inc., 785 F. Supp. 2d 855, 862 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (quoting Podolsky v. First Healthcare Corp., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 89, 98 (Ct.
App. 1996)).
267.
See Cel-Tech Commc'ns, 973 P.2d at 541 ("Although the unfair competition law's scope is sweeping, it is not unlimited.").
268. Id. at 544.
269.

See NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 259, at 1-2, 14-15; see also Belton

v. Comcast Cable Holdings, L.L.C., 60 Cal. Rptr. 3d 631, 639 (Ct. App. 2007).
270.
Claridge,785 F. Supp. 2d at 863.
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mation, resulting in its compromise by a third party.271 The court
rejected a count based on a violation of the California penal code
against hacking, 272 ruling that the third-party hacker, and not the
defendant, was within the statutory scope as contemplated by the
legislature, bearing in mind that penal laws are strictly construed.27 3 On a UCL count, the court rejected plaintiffs claim for
failure to show any loss of money or property flowing from the
compromise of the personally identifying information. 27 Unasked
and unanswered is whether software development that makes possible the third party's illegal act can support a UCL claim against
the developer, whether because the developer was "unfair" in exposing consumers to risk, or because the third party's "unlawful"
conduct can be counted against the developer for UCL purposes.
Observing the California Supreme Court's caution that the
UCL must not be construed so broadly as to render it vague to
commercial actors, a district court of appeals in California in In re
Firearm Cases275 limited the reach of the law when cities and
counties sued handgun manufacturers, distributors, and retailers for
allowing firearms to fall into criminal hands. To define the reach
of the UCL and abide the direction of the state high court, the
Firearm court borrowed modestly from causation in tort and required "a link between a defendant's business practice and the alleged harm": that "the challenged practice must be the likely cause
of substantial injury." 276 Thus, in one prior case, plaintiffs appropriately had "set forth a direct causal relationship between the conduct of false advertising and the harm of purchasing sugared cereals," 27 7 while in another prior case, "the court found no unfairness
in a lender's financing practices where the borrowers were aware
of the widely used practice," even if they were harmed by it.27 8

271.

Id. at 858-59.

502(c) (West 2010).
2d at 863.
785
F.
Supp.
273.
Claridge,
274. Id. at 862-63.
In re FirearmCases, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659 (Ct. App. 2005).
275.
276. Id. at 674.
Id at 672 (citing Comm. on Children's Television, Inc. v. Gen. Foods
277.
Corp., 673 P.2d 660, 668-69 (Cal. 1983)).
278.
Id at 672 (citing S. Bay Chevrolet v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp.,
85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 316-17 (Ct. App. 1999)).
272.

CAL. PENAL CODE §
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In another instructive case on the latter score, a state appellate court rejected vicarious, aiding-and-abetting, or otherwise associative UCL liability for VISA financial services on plaintiffs
theory that VISA should have acted to stop, once it knew about,
the misuse of its payment system to perpetuate illegal foreign lotteries.2 79 The Firearmcourt recognized that handgun retailers and
manufacturers are connected along a supply chain with their customers' subsequent buyers, who use guns in crimes, much like
VISA's link in the transactional chain between lottery and victim.280 But also like VISA, the handgun defendants "played no
part in the actual wrongdoing and had not committed an unfair
practice." 28 1 The Firearm court contrasted its facts and the VISA
case with "[a]n analogous non-[UCL]" criminal case, Direct Sales
Co. v. United States, 82 in which a pharmaceutical manufacturer
was held responsible in conspiracy for supplying a doctor with
large quantities of morphine, which the doctor dispensed illegally
to drug addicts and dealers.283 Mere knowledge of subsequent
misuse would not necessarily have supported the conspiracy
charge, but evidence showed that defendant, informed of the misuse by federal authorities, then "changed its practices to circumvent the government's proposed restrictions and affirmatively advised the doctor to do the same." 284 Evidence in the Firearm Cases supported neither defendants' actual knowledge nor "action to
aid or encourage" subsequent illegal transfers. 2 85
In tort terms, the Firearmcourt was not wholly consistent
in its use of causation as a limiting concept in UCL application, if,
saliently, some limit can be found. The examples of false advertising resulting in sugary-cereal purchases and of consumers borrowing despite dubious financing practices suggest that causation-infact is key, as often it is in fraud.28 6 That is, the plaintiff would not
279. Id. at 675 (citing Emery v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d
25, 31 (Ct. App. 2002)).
280. Id. at 675-76 (citing Emery, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 31).
281.
Id. at 676 (citing Emery, 116 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37).
282.
319 U.S. 703 (1943).
283. In re Firearm Cases, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 676 (citing DirectSales, 319
U.S. at 704-08).
284. Id. at 676-77 (citing Direct Sales, 319 U.S. at 712).
285. Id. at 677
286. See 37 C.J.S. Fraud§ 37 (2008 & Supp. 2013).
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have suffered injury but for the defendant's offensive business
practice. But causation-in-fact was present in both VISA and Direct Sales, in which the defendants were intermediaries in chains
of transactions. The controlling principle in those cases seems to
have been legal causation. VISA's payment-system practices and
the pharmaceutical manufacturer's sales practices were less and
more attenuated in causal connection with the injuries plaintiffs
complained of, the former standing-by in passive disregard of outcome, the latter more proactively facilitating outcome. So the
business practices are said, respectively, not to have substantially
caused, and to have substantially caused, the injuries complained
of. Whether more evidence might sufficiently strengthen the connection alleged in the Firearm Cases as to sustain a UCL suit is
unknown and might be a question inevitably entwined with public
policy. 287 Likely as in tort law, factual and legal causation both are
prerequisite to liability: "Without evidence of a causative link between the unfair act and the injuries or damages, unfairness by itself merely exists as a will-o'-the-wisp legal principle." 288
2.

Affirmative Defenses of Business Justification, Free
Speech, and Anti-SLAPP

The UCL is further limited in scope by affirmative defenses, which include, of pertinence, "business justification," preemption, and the First Amendment. The business-justification defense
overlaps substantially with defense on the merits against an "unfairness" claim.2 89 The defendant may establish "that the challenged conduct is an essential part of its business operations or that
it is acting consistent[ly] with industry practice for an important
reason."290 For example, a customary collateral payment to a
mortgage broker in a financing transaction is not "unfair" to a

287.
See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Causation in
Tort Law: An Economic Approach, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 130-31 (1983) (discussing the potential problem that occurs when defendants are liable for unrelated harm but "cause comes to the rescue").
In re Firearm Cases, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 672.
288.
NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 259, at 20.
289.
Id. (citing Walker v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 121 Cal. Rptr.
290.
2d 79, 91 (Ct. App. 2002)).
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lender.291 Preemption may mitigate UCL liability, for example,
insofar as credit card account convenience checks carry sufficient
disclosures under federal banking regulations. 292
The First Amendment operates in defense against the UCL,
though not necessarily dispositively. 293 In the furthest advancing
case on point, the California Supreme Court upheld the UCL as a
commercial-speech regulation, but that case implicated the UCL as
a regulation of false or misleading advertising. 294 One authority
noted an earlier California Supreme Court case, from 1986, in
which the court on free-speech grounds rejected a UCL claim
against The New York Times for an asserted slight in its bestseller
book list.295 The court did not regard the list as "commercial
speech" but also construed the plaintiffs complaint as an assertion
of falsity. 296 Thus to prevent an end-run of free-speech protections
born in the civil rights era, the Court analogized to defamation doctrine.29 7 With the First Amendment thus implicated, the UCL
claim failed; fatally, UCL liability required neither specific identification of the plaintiff in the offending expression, nor a fault
standard greater than strict liability. 29 8 The court also rejected the
plaintiffs claim of tortious interference for the former First
Amendment deficiency, for whatever the name of the cause, "the
gravamen of the claim is injurious falsehood." 29 9 Left unclear is
First Amendment application to UCL or interference claims when
there is no allegation of falsehood in the expression alleged to have
injured the plaintiff. The discussion in Part II.A regarding Bartnicki v. Vopper 30 0 and tortious interference accomplished by truthful expression pertains here as well.
291. Id. at 20 n.125 (citing Byars v. SCME Mortg. Bankers, Inc., 135 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 796, 806 (Ct. App. 2003)).
292. Id. at 28-29 & n.163 (citing Rose v. Chase Bank U.S.A., N.A., 513
F.3d 1032, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008)).
293. Id. at 24-25.
294. Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 250-55, 262 (Cal. 2002).
295.

NEWMAN ET AL., supra note 259, at 24 n.146 (citing Blatty v. N.Y.

Times Co., 728 P.2d 1177 (Cal. 1986)).
296. Blatty, 728 P.2d at 1186-87 & n.3.
297. Id. at 1181-84.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 1184-86.
300. 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
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An anti-SLAPP motion may also defeat a claim under the
UCL. For example, a court granted an anti-SLAPP motion as to a
UCL claim, but not as to defamation and interference claims in the
same case, in an employer's action against former employees and a
community activist. 30 ' Defendant labor advocates had organized
against the firing of workers without valid social security numbers,
accusing the plaintiff of, inter alia, unfairness, racism, and exploitation. 302 The trial court rejected the UCL claim "because there
was no evidence to support the conclusion that defendants were
engaged in a 'business' act or practice." 303
The California UCL is a version of the model Unfair Trade
Practices and Consumer Protection Act "developed by the Federal
Trade Commission and published by the Council of State Governments in 1967. ,304 In adaptation, California law-including the
UCL-is drafted and construed broadly relative to the states, furthering a tradition of consumer protection in California. Considering that tradition and the concentration of high technology and
communication industries in California, the UCL is useful to model a maximally expansive liability potential. Multistate law on unfair competition in the United States is not as generous. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition sets the boundary between
"the freedom to compete" and liability at five disjunctive thresholds: (1) deceptive marketing; (2) trademark or similar infringement of identity; (3) appropriation of trade value or right of publicity; (4) actionable misconduct under common, state, federal, or
international law; or (5) a catch-all, "other acts or practices of the
actor determined to be actionable as an unfair method of competition, taking into account the nature of the conduct and its likely
effect on both the person seeking relief and the public." 305 Of
Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez, 119 Cal. Rptr. 3d 127, 132-33 (Ct.
301.
App. 2010).
302. Id. at 133-35.
303.
Minute Order at 2, Overhill Farms, Inc. v. Lopez, No. 30-200900125409-CU-BT-CJC (Ca. Sup. Ct. Nov. 13, 2009).
304.
(1995)

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION
(citing COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS,

§ I statutory note

29 SUGGESTED

STATE

LEGISLATION 141 (1970)).

305.
Id. § 1. The annotation to the section lists the controlling statutory
enactments in each state, including CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101
(West 2008 & Supp. 2013). Id. § I statutory note.
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those theories, the only with potential application here are appropriation, predicate wrongful conduct, and the catch-all. Appropriation of trade secrets will be considered in connection with civil
theft in Part II.C. Predicate wrongful conduct, which includes
copyright or patent infringement, breach of contract, and commission of tort,30 6 incorporates other law by reference, so it is in that
respect coextensive with, and otherwise eclipsed by, the broad California UCL. Under the catch-all, or so-called residual rule, the
Restatement opined that "a definitive test" is impossible to divine. 307 The authors further explained:
It is impossible to state a definitive test for determining which methods of competition will be
deemed unfair in addition to those included in the
categories of conduct described in the preceding
Comments. Courts continue to evaluate competitive practices against generalized standards of fairness and social utility. Judicial formulations have
broadly appealed to principles of honesty and fair
dealing, rules of fair play and good conscience, and
the morality of the marketplace. The case law,
however, is far more circumscribed than such rhetoric might indicate, and courts have generally been
reluctant to interfere in the competitive process. An
act or practice is likely to be judged unfair only if it
substantially interferes with the ability of others to
compete on the merits of their products or otherwise
conflicts with accepted principles of public policy
recognized by statute or common law.308
The authors provided only examples that wholly overlap
with the underlying wrongs requisite for tortious interference (encompassed by the Restatement and discussed in Part II.A): physical interference, bad-faith institution of legal proceedings, defamation and disparagement, and unlawful restraint of trade. 309 In ex306.
307.
308.
309.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

Id. § 1 cmt. g.
Id.
Id. § 1 reporters' note.

§ 1 cmt. h (1995).

2013

In Tort Pursuitof Mass Media

327

amining social utility, the actor's conduct may be tested for "propriety," again invoking the balance of tortious interference.310 Further:
A competitor who diverts business from another by
means of fraudulent misrepresentations or through
the wrongful use of confidential information, for
example, may in some circumstances be subject to
liability for unfair competition even if the conduct is
not specifically actionable under the rules relating
to deceptive marketing or the appropriation of trade
secrets. 31 1
But the authors were quick to reiterate the circumscription of the
residual rule. If "an important policy of the law" is the impediment to liability for the underlying wrong, then "the conduct
should not be actionable as unfair competition." 3 12
A bank's unauthorized disclosure of customer data violates
both U.S. federal law 3 13 and the California Financial Information
Privacy Act. 314 Those laws mostly bind financial institutions. 315
The provisions governing subsequent disclosures by recipients of
confidential information, read in context, apply only in cases of
authorized disclosures by the originating financial institution.316
The federal statute, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6802(c), controls subsequent disclosures by "a nonaffiliated third party that receives
from a financial institution nonpublic personal information under
this section.
Other parts of § 6802 outline exceptions to the
disclosures,
so "this section" extends disclosure
prohibition on
310. Id. § I cmt. g.
311.
Id.
312.
Id.
313.
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6801-6809 (2012)).
314.

CAL. FIN. CODE

§§ 4050-4060 (West 1999 & Supp. 2013).

See id §§ 4052(c), 4052.5, 4057.
315.
316.
See id § 4053.5.
15 U.S.C. §6802(c). See generally 9 C.J.S. Banks and Banking § 270
317.
(2008 & Supp. 2013) (summarizing regulation of disclosure of customer information by financial institutions under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Modernization Act).
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prohibitions only along with those authorized disclosures by the
originating financial institution. California law similarly refers to
"an entity that receives nonpublic personal information from a financial institution under this division." 318 This division includes
the totality of the act and permits disclosure upon exceptions parallel to the federal statute.31
3.

Liability Theories in Baer Bank and Big Tobacco

Baer Bank and Brown & Williamson have standing to
claim unfair competition against WikiLeaks and CBS, respectively. Plaintiffs might be required to generate evidence of money
damages more specific than Baer Bank's claim of reputational injury and customer alienation. But it is conceivable that, if pressed,
plaintiffs could point to specific lost accounts and lost income.
Depending on the exact nature of the information leaked, plaintiffs,
especially Brown & Williamson, may also point to a monetary loss
through the devaluation of revealed trade secrets. Even if unfaircompetition remedies are limited to equity, plaintiffs could be entitled to injunctive relief and restitution.
The obstacle for plaintiffs is the ill-defined requirement that
the defendant be engaged in a "business" practice. Under broad
readings of unfair-competition law, the defendant need not be in
business competition with the plaintiff.320 Surely it is arguable that
neither WikiLeaks nor CBS is in business at all for purposes of
republication as an unfair business practice. The California UCL
analyzes the problem alternatively from policy perspectives of fair
competition and public protection; here, the cases might diverge.
Brown & Williamson has no greater public policy argument in
non-disclosure other than the general policies supporting tradesecret and contract law; CBS has a powerful public-health argument working in its favor. But Baer Bank has going for it the disclosure of customer banking data. Thus, viewed from a policy perspective, WikiLeaks, which trades in information and relies on
318.

CAL. FIN. CODE

§ 4053.5.

Compare id. §§ 4050-4060, with 15 U.S.C. § 6802(e).
319.
320.
Cf E. H. Schopflocher, Annotation, Actual Competition as Necessary
Element of Trademark Infringement or Unfair Competition, 148 A.L.R. 12, 5558 (1944) (showing that many jurisdictions dispense with the competition requirement even on fact patterns of trademark or trade-name appropriation).
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Internet traffic to support its fundraising efforts, may be viewed as
in "business" for unfair-competition purposes. Though WikiLeaks
is not a financial institution, it thrives at the bank's expense, each
in its trade. CBS's case, in turn, is weakened if it is true that executives acted strategically to preserve their position in a Westinghouse takeover. Brown & Williamson would argue that CBS, like
WikiLeaks, is in the profit-making business, whether the product is
entertainment or news.
There is a possibility that "business" will be defined in
connection with the alleged underlying wrongs; that approach
might be beneficial to both defendants but does not resolve the
matter dispositively. Whether or not violation of customer rights
in banking can support an unfair-competition claim as a separate
wrong, WikiLeaks is not engaged in the business practices of financial institutions as contemplated by banking regulations. At the
same time, though, one might regard banking privacy as principally about privacy, and WikiLeaks is in the "business" of attracting
readers with salacious information. Similarly, CBS is not even in
the "business" of product manufacture for purposes of trade-secret
law. But even as a news enterprise, CBS is in the "business" of
kept and broken promises with respect to information; maybe facilitating information transfer in violation of contract is part of the
CBS information "business."
The causation approach of the Firearm Cases aggravates
this tension. Unfair-competition law rejects associative forms of
liability, but association and direct liability exist along a chain of
causation and are not separated by a bright line. Both defendants
may argue that causation-in-fact is lacking, that Wigand and Elmer
would have found a way to publish their information regardless of
defendants' platforms. But on the facts, both defendants did provide the avenues of publication, and thus scientifically caused the
injury to the plaintiffs, advancing the question to legal causation.
In this respect, if the allegations against WikiLeaks and CBS were
simply that they operated websites employed by reckless leakers,
at arm's length, then the defendants could not be said to have substantially caused the injury complained of (and they would enjoy
statutory immunity 321). But Baer Bank and Brown & Williamson
321.
The Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 133 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 230), creates federal immunity "to any
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alleged more proactive roles for their defendants. Were the defendants VISA, a neutral observer on the sidelines of unfair transactions, or were they a pharmaceutical manufacturer working to
keep the money flowing by maneuvering around law enforcement
counsel? The defendants surely had actual knowledge, but whether they aided or encouraged is a disputed question of fact that cannot be ducked on insufficient pleadings, as in the Firearm Cases.
If the question ultimately is driven by public policy, then the
court's perception of the problem as one of corrective or distributive justice might weigh heavily for or against causation.
"Business" will be an uphill argument for the plaintiffs, but
clearly the question bleeds into the analysis of the alleged underlying wrong. Here, the salient analysis duplicates the search for an
underlying wrong in tortious interference. If WikiLeaks can be
said to have been complicit in the Baer Bank leak, or CBS can be
said to have been complicit in Wigand's breach of confidence, then
the conversion or appropriation of trade value is an underlying
wrong sufficient to support an unfair-competition theory. No separate law controls CBS publication of trade secrets revealed.
Baer Bank, however, also alleged violations of banking and
privacy laws in Switzerland, the Cayman Islands, and California.
It seems likely that the "violation" to which Baer Bank referred is
actually Baer Bank's inadvertent own, for which the bank sought
to blame WikiLeaks. Neither federal nor California law on confidentiality in banking can be read so broadly as to suggest that prohibitions follow the information wherever it goes, so neither law
binds WikiLeaks or would bind CBS today.3 2 2 Other California
privacy laws are similarly circumscribed in application;3 23 for example, California privacy law constrains businesses, including

cause of action that would make computer service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the service." Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1064 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
322. As to a covered entity, the federal confidentiality law survived intermediate scrutiny upon a First Amendment challenge. Trans Union L.L.C. v.
F.T.C., 295 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
323. See Privacy Laws, CAL. DEP'T OF JUST.: OFFICE OF THE ATT'Y GEN.,
http://oag.ca.gov/privacy/privacy-laws (last visited Dec. 12, 2013) (providing a
summary of California's privacy laws).
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banks, in the maintenance of their own customer records324 and
restricts the use of consumer medical information in marketing. 325
Unresolved is the question in Claridge concerning whether
the defendants' disclosures, even if legal, might be "unfair" within
the meaning of unfair competition. With regard to the defendants'
conduct in arguably facilitating the appropriation of trade value or
conversion of confidential records, plaintiffs may argue that "unfairness" should close any gap in certainty over associative culpability for the underlying wrong. Certainly the defendants published with knowing disregard for the rights of the plaintiffs, and in
the WikiLeaks case, for the rights of banking customers. The latter
implication of public rights especially might push the court to find
unfairness short of unlawfulness, whether predicated on the near
tort or on the violation in spirit of banking laws.
The substantive law of Switzerland or of the Cayman Islands is beyond the expertise of this author to analyze. But a word
is warranted on the Data Protection Directive 326 of the European
Union and the proposed EU privacy regulation that would supersede it.327 In EU law, consumers are permitted a measure of control over the privacy or non-privacy of their information even after
they part with it.32 8 The proposed regulation would expand this
consumer authority and expand radically the scope of the law by
applying it to foreign entities that only do business with EU citizens. 329 The EU system imposes obligations on data "controllers"
and "processors" and is not confined to specific contexts such as

CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.80-84 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013).
324.
Id. § 1798.91.
325.
Directive 95/46, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
326.
Oct. 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of
Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31,
availableat http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L: 1995
:281:0031:0050:EN:PDF.
Proposalfor a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
327.
Council on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processingof Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data (General Data Protection
Regulation), COM (2012) 11 final (Jan. 25, 2012), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/document/review2012/com 2012_11
en.pdf.
328.
Peltz-Steele, supra note 240, at 407.
329.
Id. at 373.
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bank-client or seller-buyer. 330 WikiLeaks might not become a data
processor merely by receiving information that contains personal
information, but the simple organization of its data stores, perhaps
indexing persons referenced, could bring WikiLeaks into the regulatory purview. Similarly, news organizations like CBS worry
about the implications of privacy regulation for their news databases; the scope of a journalist exception to the proposed regulation is a subject of ongoing contentious discussion. 33 1 Violation of
EU privacy law may result in injunctive relief and damages in the
*332
legal systems of participating nations.
If a defendant can be shown subject to and in violation of
foreign law-both Baer Bank and WikiLeaks have physical and
financial presence in the EU-then that violation may serve as a
predicate wrong for unfair competition in the manner that supports
Baer Bank's claim. With the EU setting the trend in privacy law
and moving the world away from the weaker rights model of the
United States,33 3 the viability of such a liability theory is enhanced.
This threat has already caused considerable handwringing by U.S.
media institutions and set the stage for a transatlantic showdown
like the one unfolding in libel tourism.334 As defendants in the
United States, WikiLeaks and CBS would resist liability affirmatively by claiming that EU privacy regulation is repugnant to U.S.
law and policy of free speech.3 3 5
4. Unfair Competition and the First Amendment
Whether as a defense against the operation of foreign law
or the enforcement of foreign judgment, or directly as an affirmative defense, the First Amendment will necessitate analysis in an
unfair-competition claim in the United States. As in the interfer330. Id. at 366 & n.3.
331.
See id. at 379-83.
332. Id. at 377.
333.
See generally id at 409-10 (summarizing the gravitational influence
of EU balancing approach on U.S. privacy law and policy).
334. See id. at 370 & n.24.
335.
Cf Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act,
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1716(b)(3) (West 2007 & Supp. 2013) (stating that a
California court is not required to recognize a foreign-money judgment "repugnant to the public policy of this state or of the United States").
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ence area with regard to impropriety and justification, the defense
of privileged speech is functionally the same as pleading "not unfair" if the unfair-competition claim is predicated on unfairness.
The problem of whether the First Amendment applies to an
unfair-competition claim, and the impact if it does, is analogous to
the problem in tortious interference. As in tortious interference, a
strong anti-SLAPP law could win the day for the defense before an
appeals court ever passes on the free-speech arguments. On the
merits, the New York Times booklist case suggests that the WikiLeaks and CBS enterprises are both entitled to protection as noncommercial speech, indicating that the First Amendment from the
back end may push the "business" analysis to defendants' favor.
But where truth and not falsity is at issue, it seems unlikely that the
First Amendment would simply negate the unfair-competition
claim. Perhaps the First Amendment has no application when the
gravamen of the claim is truth, or perhaps the First Amendment
precludes liability upon a matter of public concern. In the latter
case, WikiLeaks again might be vulnerable for the revelations of
customer data. Unfair-competition law should survive intermediate scrutiny for the important government interests of a fair marketplace and consumer protection. But an approach such as the
Third Circuit's in Bartnicki might conclude that application of the
law to a non-competitive journalistic "business" fails narrow tailoring. Or a Rehnquist approach might generalize the consumerprotection interest at least to condemn WikiLeaks for re-publishing
the customer data. In sum, it is possible to chart a course to unfaircompetition liability.
5.

Unfair-Competition Liability Exposure in Sum

The same pattern of a winning defense case on the precipice of forfeit as found in interference can be found again in the
analysis of unfair competition. Unfair-competition law seems an
unlikely foundation for publisher liability, but broad conceptions
of the doctrine are increasingly willing to embrace a defendant that
is not in direct competition with the plaintiff if the defendant's own
business model is nonetheless injurious to the plaintiff's business.
Whether or not the theory formally adopts the language of associative liability, unfair-competition claims may be analyzed as problems in causation, where the defendant's volitional intercession
between a bad actor and the plaintiff renders the defendant liable
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for its role in bringing about the injurious result. Again, the court,
in essence, asks after the defendant's culpability. Closer association with the bad actor-here, the leaker-is incriminating, and a
defendant's ordinary business practices, such as intermediating
products or services, may draw liability when the defendant proceeds with the knowledge of a benefit furnished to the bad actor.
Thus, a media defendant may be characterized as enriching itself at
the expense of the plaintiffs business. The First Amendment
might or might not operate as a defense, following the uncertain
model in interference.
C. Actions Related to the Theft of Trade Secrets: Conversion,
Trespass to Chattels, Breach of Confidence, Further
Associative Liability, and Trade Secret Appropriation
Common-law theories of civil theft, namely conversion and
trespass, at least in their current iterations, probably cannot support
liability for the leaked publisher. But a viable civil-theft theory
may be found in the law of trade-secret appropriation, and the
predicate theory of impropriety that operates there may also support a theory of breach of confidence.
1. Conversion and Trespass
In many states, common-law conversion and trespass to
chattels have no application in a case of leaked corporate secrets
because those torts historically make no allowance for intangible
property interests. Conversion is the "intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel which so seriously interferes with
the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be required to pay the other the full value of the chattel."3 36 Closely
336.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 222A(l) (1965). The Restate-

ment listed factors that guide the assessment of seriousness of interference:
(a) the extent and duration of the actor's exercise of dominion
or control;
(b) the actor's intent to assert a right in fact inconsistent with
the other's right of control;
(c) the actor's good faith;
(d) the extent and duration of the resulting interference with
the other's right of control;
(e) the harm done to the chattel;
(f) the inconvenience and expense caused to the other.
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related is the tort of trespass to chattels, effected by intentionally
dispossessing another by "using or intermeddling with" the owner's exclusive possession.33 7 The requisite intent here is intent in
its simplest form, as in battery or false imprisonment. 33 8 In the
modem era, the Restatement authors explained that "the difference
between [trespass and conversion] becomes almost entirely a matter of degree," 339 manifesting in the quantum of damages. 340
The Restatement admonished that the concept of personal
property in common-law conversion and trespass is expanding,34 1
even where it does not yet embrace intangibles, 342 such as to customer lists, confidential information, or ideas. 343 Even in conservative jurisdictions, common-law countenances a conversion
claim when document and property interest merge, as in a deed,
which represents ownership. 344 Texas law, for example, disallows
actions for conversion of copyrights and trademarks, but allows an
action for conversion of software insofar as the wrongful act is
theft of written code.34 5 Ohio courts found sufficient physicality in
domain names and email addresses to find a conversion claim. 346
2.

Appropriation of Trade Secrets and Breach of Confidence

Nevertheless, there is certainly civil liability for the theft of
trade secrets, whether denominated as a common-law action for
conversion, trespass, appropriation, or unfair competition, or contemplated by statute. Pollack compiled sources of law for misappropriation of trade secrets and explained that the Uniform Trade
Secrets Acts ("UTSA"), as variously construed in the states, is es-

Id. § 222A(2).
337.
Id. § 217.
Id. § 217 cmt. c.
338.
Id. § 222A cmt. a.
339.
Id. § 222A cmt. c.
.340.
Id. § 242 cmt. f.
341.
Id. § 242 cmt. b.
342.
Id. § 242 reporter's notes (citing various cases).
343.
344. Id. § 242(1).
Quantlab Techs. Ltd. (BVI) v. Godlevsky, 719 F. Supp. 2d 766, 778
345.
(S.D. Tex. 2010).
See, e.g., Eysoldt v. ProScan Imaging, 957 N.E.2d 780, 786 (Ohio Ct.
346.
App. 2011).
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pecially important. 34 7 Insofar as the UTSA applies, state courts
generally regard it as superseding other tort remedies, including
conversion and trespass,348 and absorbing their associative wrongs
such as civil conspiracy.349 The definition of a "trade secret" as
information reasonably safeguarded in business for its economic
advantage is broad enough to encompass more than just proprietary formulae or invention as one imagines in the usual scope of
intellectual property. 350 Trade secrets may include customer lists,
but do not include simply any information held close, such as the
anticipated date of a new product launch.3 5 1
The elements of a UTSA in California, as representative,
are: "(1) the plaintiff owned a trade secret, (2) the defendant acquired, disclosed, or used the plaintiffs trade secret through improper means, and (3) the defendant's actions damaged the plaintiff."3 5 2 The statutory definition is further illuminating, as the second element can be satisfied, at its pertinent extreme, by an actor's

347.

127 AM. JUR. TRIALS Litigating Misappropriationof Trade Secret

§§ 5-6 (2012). The Restatement (Second) of Torts did not fully cover unfair
competition, and the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, at least as of
yet, is not widely cited. Id. § 5. Criminal remedies are also available for theft of
trade secrets in both state and federal law, see 18 U.S.C. § 1832 (2012), the latter when the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, is satisfied.
348. See Julie Piper, Comment, I Have a Secret?: Applying the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act to Confidential Information that Does Not Rise to the Level of
Trade Secret Status, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 359, 371 (2008) (citing

R.K. Enter., LLC v. Pro-Comp Mgmt., 158 S.W.3d 685, 690 (Ark. 2004)). The
question has added wrinkles when confidential information that is not necessarily a trade secret is at issue. See, e.g., Charles Tait Graves & Elizabeth Tippett,
UTSA Preemption and the Public Domain: How Courts Have Overlooked Patent Preemption of State Law Claims Alleging Employee Wrongdoing, 65
RUTGERS L. REV. 59, 64-85 (2012) (discussing scope of UTSA such that a state
tort might not survive).
349. See Theranos, Inc. v. Fuisz Pharma L.L.C., 876 F. Supp. 2d 1123,
1138 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding civil conspiracy theory viable where UTSA did
not preempt all common-law claims); see also ProductiveMD, L.L.C. v. 4UMD,
L.L.C., 821 F. Supp. 2d 955, 967 (M.D. Tenn. 2011).
350.
127 AM. JUR. TRIALS Litigating Misappropriationof Trade Secret

§ 15.
351.
See id.
352. Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp., 3 Cal. Rptr. 3d 279, 283 (Ct.
App. 2003) (citing CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 (West 1997)).
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un-consented disclosure of a trade secret with knowledge or reason
to know that the actor's possession of the secret was:
(i) [d]erived from or through a person who had utilized improper means to acquire it;
(ii) [a]cquired under circumstances giving rise to a
duty to maintain its secrecy or limit its use; or
(iii) [d]erived from or through a person who owed a
duty to the person seeking relief to maintain its se353
crecy or limit its use ... .3
Disclosure is thus deliberately placed in the disjunctive, and intentionality is weakly formulated to mean, minimally, a volitional act
with reason to know the circumstances. "The fact that the defendant learned the secret from a third person will not prevent liability
from attaching if the defendant had notice that the information was
secret and that the third party had acted improperly." 354
Injunctive relief is the ordinary remedy for trade-secret
misappropriation, 355 but compensatory damages may also be
awarded upon plaintiffs lost profits or business goodwill, defendant's profits, or reasonable royalties. 356 Furthermore, some jurisdictions authorize punitive multipliers and attorneys' fees in cases
of willful and malicious misappropriation. 357
"Improper" appears again as a key concept. Here, it is not
limited to unlawful or tortious conduct 358 and may include lawful
353.

CAL. CIV. CODE

OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 3426.1(b)(2)(B); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)

§ 40(b) (1995).

354.
14 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Misappropriationof Trade Secrets
Under the Restatement of Torts § 5 (1991) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 757(c) (1939)).
355.
127 AM. JUR. TRIALS Litigating Misappropriationof Trade Secret

§ 47.
356.

Id

§ 48; see also 14 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Misappropriation

of Trade Secrets Under the Restatement of Torts §§ 19-22 (discussing remedies).
127 AM. JUR. TRIALS Litigating Misappropriationof Trade Secret
357.
§§49-50.
358.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3426.1 legislative committee cmt. (citing E.I.
duPont deNemours & Co., v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970) (lawful
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spying or inducement of a breach of duty of secrecy. 359 As usual,
the term "improper" defies comprehensive definition. 360 No intent
to acquire a trade secret is required for liability, though Wasson
explained that this "theoretical irrelevance . . . is frequently contra-

dicted in practice," as "[tihe defendant's intent, or lack of intent, is
often inextricably bound up with the issue of his or her good faith,
which may play a major, if often unacknowledged, role in determining the outcome of trade secrets litigation." 36 1 Also, as usual,
an affirmative defense of propriety is available and may be substantively indistinguishable from a lack of proof of impropriety. 362
Nothing about the rule of impropriety requires that the
plaintiff and defendant be in commercial competition. Nevertheless, impropriety via lawful action to induce breach of confidence
usually plays out in fact patterns involving commercial competition, such as when one company poaches a valuable employee
from another and then "induces" the new acquisition to share secrets from the previous workplace. 363 Commercial ethics animate
the rule,3 6 so a company may misappropriate trade secrets simply
upon knowingly accepting them when offered from the disgruntled
former employee of a competitor.365

aerial reconnaissance)); accord RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. h
(1939) ("If the actor procures the secret by a voluntary disclosure by such third
person in breach of his duty and the actor employs no improper means to cause
the disclosure, he is not subject to liability under the rule [of acquiring secrets
improperly], though he may be liable under the rule [of disclosing secrets improperly]."). See generally Michael A. Rosenhouse, Annotation, ProperMeasure and Elements of Damages for Misappropriation of Trade Secret, 11
A.L.R.4TH 12 (1982 & Supp. 2013).
359.
CAL. CIV. CODE 3426.1(a); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 43 cmt. c (1995).
360.
14 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Misappropriationof Trade Secrets
Under the Restatement of Torts § 15 (1991) (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF
TORTS § 757 cmt. f (1939)).

361.
362.

Id.
Id. § 18.

363.
See Mixing Equip. Co. v. Phila. Gear, Inc., 312 F. Supp. 1269, 1273
(E.D. Pa. 1970), modified, 436 F.2d 1308 (3d Cir. 1971).
364.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 43 cmt. c (1995)

(citing Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 487 (1974)).
365. Id. § 43 cmt. c., illus. 4.
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Breach of a fiduciary duty of confidence pertains here because aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty as a civil
wrong under common-law tort366 is interchangeable with predicate
impropriety under the UTSA. As stated in the Restatement (Third)
of Agency, an agent must not "use or communicate confidential
information of the principal for the agent's own purposes or those
of a third party." 367 Violation is an intentional tort, 368 so the associative roles of Restatement (Second) of Torts section 876369 may
give rise to liability.
As mentioned in Part II.A regarding tortious interference,
indemnification to incentivize breach of a fiduciary duty is actionable in tort370 as long as the inducement in fact resulted in interference with plaintiffs economic position. 3 7 1 The inducement to violate a known duty comes easily within the ambit of the agency rule
of duty supplemented by the tort rule of "aiding and abetting." 372
Baron, Lane, and Schulz countered by pointing to cases in which
the defendant was permitted to indemnify a party alleged to have
breached a duty as long as the defendant bore "a legitimate interest." 373 A bank ensuring that an agent did not receive a commission to which he was not entitled bore a legitimate interest, so the
bank was able to indemnify without creating a predicate wrong for
366. See Television Events & Mktg., Inc. v. Amcon Distrib. Co., 488 F.
Supp. 2d 1071, 1075-78 (D. Haw. 2006). However, there is authority that an
actor may not be held civilly liable for breach of fiduciary duty upon an associative theory if the actor personally was not bound by the duty. Cf Wigington v.
Will, No. D042489, 2005 WL 3276351, at *6-7 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2005).
367.

368.
2006).
369.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

§ 8.05(2) (2006).

See Zastrow v. Journal Commc'ns, Inc., 718 N.W.2d 51, 62 (Wis.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 876 (1979).

370. See Baron, Lane, & Schulz, supra note 165, at 1044 (citing Edward
Vantine Studios, Inc. v. Fraternal Composite Serv., Inc., 373 N.W.2d 512, 515
(Iowa Ct. App. 1985)); see also Bayside Carting, Inc., v. Chic Cleaners, 660
N.Y.S.2d 23, 24 (App. Div. 1997).
371.
Kan. State Bank of Manhattan v. Harrisville Volunteer Fire Dep't,
886 N.Y.S.2d 278, 279 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
372.
See, e.g., S&K Sales Co. v. Nike, Inc., 816 F.2d 843, 849 (2d Cir.
1987) (allowing possibility of section 876 "aiding and abetting" liability for
breach of fiduciary duty where manufacturer entered into relationship with sales
executive knowing of executive's employment obligation to competitor).
Baron, Lane, & Schulz, supra note 165, at 1045.
373.

340

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 44

interference purposes,3 7 4 and the authors asserted that newsgathering would fit the bill as well.3 75
3.

Appropriation and Free Speech

Like its criminal counterpart, theft, conversion and its civil
siblings involve non-expressive conduct. Therefore, the catalog of
affirmative defenses against civil liability for the theft of trade secrets is unsurprisingly devoid of mention of the freedom of
speech.3 76 The expansion of the protected sphere in intellectual
property, including trade-secret protection, has drawn critics who
decry a corresponding shrinkage in the sphere of protected expression. First Amendment application in trade secrets cases has therefore become a controversial topic and generated abundant literature.377 As usual, a range of arguments has emerged. In many cases, such as those in which a defendant has acted illegally to obtain
trade secrets, the First Amendment does not appear at all; this approach is in line with Cohen v. Cowles Media Co. 3 78
Samuelson argued in favor of the rule against prior restraint
to offer a heavy presumption against injunctive relief in the rare
case in which (1) liability claims are "secondary," i.e., the defendant was a re-publisher; (2) the defendant was not in league with the
appropriator; (3) the defendant intended the publication as newsworthy, even with knowledge of the wrongful appropriation; and
(4) the defendant did not mean to exploit the information in com374. Id. at 1045 (citing Hursey Porter & Assocs. v. Bounds, No. 93C-01091, 1994 WL 762670, at *14 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec. 2, 1994) (mem.)).
375.
Id.
376.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PRACTICE Bus. LITIG. § 66:28 (2013) (summarizing defenses to trade secret appropriation).
377. The literature was compiled in Pamela Samuelson, Principlesfor
Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 777, 777-78 & n.8 (2007). See also Lindsey Furtado, Protecting
Your Secrets from the Media: A Case for California's Content-Neutral Approach to Trade Secret Injunctions, 15 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 123, 133-39

(2011); Mary-Rose Papandrea, Where Intellectual Property and Free Speech
Collide, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1307 (2009); Elizabeth A. Rowe, Trade Secret Litigation and Free Speech: Is it Time to Restrain the Plaintiffs?, 50 B.C. L. REV.
1425, 1435-40 (2009).
378. 501 U.S. 663, 671 (1991); see also Samuelson, supra note 377, at
780-81.
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petition with the plaintiff.37 9 This approach is in line with the majority approach to the wiretap problem in Bartnicki v. Vopper as
well as some other weighty precedents. Riding circuit, Justice
Blackmun refused, per the rule against prior restraints, to enjoin
CBS preliminarily from broadcasting video taken undercover inside the plaintiffs meatpacking facility for fear of prior restraint of
the media.38 o When documents under seal in commercial litigation
came into the possession of Business Week magazine, the Sixth
Circuit viewed the case as a problem of prior restraint and refused
to allow injunction of publication in the magazine upon litigants'
merely commercial interests. 38 1
Tantalizingly, in FordMotor Co. v. Lane, a federal district
court in Michigan refused to enjoin web publication of manufacturer Ford's misappropriated trade secrets, which were given to
publisher Lane by Ford employees in violation of their duty of
confidentiality. 382 Ford relied specifically on the knowingdisclosure approach to UTSA violation. 383 Lane conceded his
knowledge of Ford employees' breach of duty as to at least some
of the documents, but maintained that he was ignorant of their personal identities.384 Despite allegations that Lane used the threat of
publication to extort Ford, the court regarded itself as bound by the
Sixth Circuit ruling in the Business Week case, viewing the problem as one of prior restraint, and accordingly refused to uphold the
injunction against media defendant Lane. 38 5 The court acknowledged that Ford had protected its confidential information better
than the litigants had in Business Week or the government had in
the Pentagon Papers, but reasoned that Ford's secrets were "not
more volatile" than those at issue in the PentagonPapers and "not
more inflammatory than the anti-Semitic tabloid" that the U.S. Supreme Court famously refused to allow enjoined in Near v. Minne-

379.
380.
1994).
381.
(6th Cir.
382.
383.
384.
385.

Samuelson, supra note 377, at 833.
CBS, Inc. v. Davis, 510 U.S. 1315, 1318 (Blackmun, Circuit Justice
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 224-27
1996).
67 F. Supp. 2d 745, 746-77 (E.D. Mich. 1999).
Id. at 750.
Id. at 747-48.
Id. at 751-53 (discussing Proctor& Gamble Co., 78 F.3d 219).
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sota.386 Significantly, though, the rule against prior restraint does
not preclude an action after the fact for damages.
A middle ground, in the mold of the Third CircuitRehnquist approach to the Bartnickiproblem, is to test trade-secret
injunctions or damages under heightened scrutiny. When a court
recognizes that an injunction, whether under trade-secret law or
otherwise, operates as a restraint of free expression, the injunction
must be tested as a content-neutral (or, if appropriate, contentbased) regulation of speech.3 87 Like tortious interference, tradesecret law may be a content-neutral regulation, or incidental burden, of speech, and the protection of trade secrets easily suffices as
an important state interest. For example, in DVD Copy Control
Ass 'n v. Bunner, the Supreme Court of California upheld a preliminary injunction against the proliferation of software that could
bypass the encryption protecting copyrighted content on DVDs.388
The Court distinguished Bartnicki by concluding that no public
concem was at stake; 389 the injunction survived intermediate scrutiny for being no broader than necessary to protect the plaintiffs
property interest.390 Bunner rejected Oregon's "literalistic analysis
of content neutrality" and declined to follow the Sixth Circuit's
lead,39 ' feeding a persistent division of authority.
One commenter criticized Bunner for its conclusion on
public concern and posited that strict scrutiny would have been the
more appropriate analysis. 392 In Oregon, the state Supreme Court
struck under strict scrutiny the prior restraint of publication of a
complainant's trade secret in a newsletter, Sports Management
News, despite the applicability of the Oregon UTSA.3 93 Ruling
only under the Oregon Constitution, the Court referenced the
UTSA definition of a trade secret in concluding that the statute is a
386. Id. at 752-53 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931)).
387. Madsen v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994).
388.
75 P.3d 1, 19-20 (Cal. 2003).
389. Id. at 15-16.
390. See id. at 17.
391.
Id. at 19.
392. Alex Eaton-Salners, Note, DVD Copy Control Association v. Bunner: Freedom of Speech and Trade Secrets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 269, 28285 (2004).
393.
State ex rel. Sports Mgmt. News v. Nachtigal, 921 P.2d 1304, 130810 (Or. 1996).
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content-based speech restriction, focusing on the content proscribed rather than the harmful effects that the state meant to avert
through trade-secret law. 394
Trade-secret law has also run into the First Amendment enhancing procedure of anti-SLAPP statutes. In World Financial
Group, Inc. v. HB W Insurance and FinancialServices, Inc., competitor sued competitor alleging the appropriation and misuse of
confidential information to solicit customers. 395 HBW Insurance
moved for protection under the California anti-SLAPP statute and
attempted to characterize its customer communications as in the
public interest. 396 The court handily rejected the characterization,
pointing to a line of cases in which a union and various commercial companies portrayed themselves with "noble language" as
advancing the public interest in the free exchange of labor, products, and consumer information. 397 Deriding the "so-called 'synecdoche theory of public issue in the anti-SLAPP statute,' where
398
'[t]he part [is considered] synonymous with the greater whole,"'
the court explained that a conclusion in that vein "would effectively 'eviscerate the unfair business practices laws,' a result the Legislature plainly did not intend." 399 World Financial Group was
subsequently distinguished in a decision with consistent reasoning.
In a defamation suit, Anderson v. Staples, a California court allowed a defendant critical of the plaintiffs business to generalize
the defendant's comments as being an issue of public interest when
the defendant was speaking in the context of a consumerprotection broadcasted on local news.4 00

394. Id. at 1307-09.
92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 227, 231-32 (Ct. App. 2009).
395.
Id. at 232.
396.
Id. at 235-38.
397.
Id. at 235 (alterations in original) (quoting Commonwealth Energy
398.
Corp. v. Investor Data Exch., Inc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 3d 390, 395 (Ct. App. 2003)).
399.
Id. at 236 (quoting Jewett v. Capital One Bank, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 675,
682 (Ct. App. 2003)).
400.
No. D056796, 2010 WL 3936051, at *7-8 (Cal. Ct. App. Oct. 8,
2010).
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4. Liability Exposure in Baer Bank and Big Tobacco on Civil
Theft and Related Theories
Baer Bank alleged a count of conversion against WikiLeaks, pointing to the bank's property interest and "intrinsic business value" in its stolen documents and to defendants' use of and
refusal to return the documents. 40 1 In its recitation of facts, the
bank alleged that WikiLeaks knew the documents were "unlawfully obtained" and disclosed by a source, Elmer, who violated banking privacy law.40 2 If WikiLeaks did not know the circumstances
when the documents were posted, then it learned them from plaintiff's counsel and refused to take down the postings. 403
Though WikiLeaks' knowledge and refusal to return documents fit the mold of conversion, the claim is a stretch for lack of
physicality in the stolen goods. Original documents were copied,
not removed, from the bank, so the theft really was one of customer lists and confidential information. Despite the claim of intrinsic
value, the documents merged with no intangible right. They did
not represent physical property in the manner of a deed or proof of
ownership. While the customer lists and confidential information
might aid an identity thief, the data alone did not empower WikiLeaks or its users to deprive the bank or its customers of dominion
over their money. As conversion and trespass to chattels continue
to grow in accommodation of the electronic era, it is imaginable
that they will encompass the copying and disclosure of confidential
information. The Ohio rulings on domain names and email accounts point in this direction, but still suggest deprivation of access
to virtual spaces. At present, then, conversion and trespass are not
the best fit for the facts.
The same conclusion is inescapable in the tobacco case, in
which Brown & Williamson's claim went only to information in
Wigand's mind, to be revealed through testimony. However,
CBS's interest in big tobacco was spurred at the beginning of the
Insider story by Bergman's receipt of confidential Philip Morris
documents, anonymously delivered. Interpreting those documents
is what spurred Bergman to seek out Wigand. Likely a Philip
401.
402.
403.

Complaint, supra note 65,
Id. TT 6, 29.
Id. 29.

61-64.
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Morris insider copied the documents, like Ellsberg copied the Pentagon Papers. Ellsberg in fact removed the Pentagon Papers, volumes at a time, from his office for copying. Were he caught with
the documents off-site, he would have been liable for conversion
or trespass, though returning the documents without compromising
them physically probably would have precluded recovery. It bears
remembering that damage or theft of original documents-imagine
the attempt to steal Ellsberg's psychiatric file, had it been found
and removed-may still implicate trespass or conversion, and if
the re-publisher is complicit in the act, then associative tort liability may attach.
Conversion and trespass might be a stretch, but appropriation of trade secrets fits both cases nicely. Within its unfaircompetition claim, Baer Bank made essentially the same allegations as it did on the conversion count. 404 The Baer Bank files included customer lists as well as confidential information about
both customers and business methods, all data within the modern
scope of trade-secret protection. 4 05 In the tobacco case, what manufacturers knew about cigarette production and nicotine addiction
is classic fodder for trade-secret protection, evidenced by Wigand's confidentiality agreement.4 Much would qualify over the
definitional hurdles as a trade secret, if not every leaked datum.
Both Baer Bank and Brown & Williamson could be expected to
prove damages as well, caused and amplified by the mass dissemination of their secrets; loss of business goodwill alone may serve
as a starting point.
The key is the second element of trade-secret appropriation:
acquisition, disclosure, or use through improper means. Plaintiffs'
cases are strong. In both cases, the confidential nature of the information was obvious.4 07 Wigand's violation of duty was known
to CBS, prompting the internal discussion about potential liability.
Were there any doubt in the WikiLeaks case, bank counsel gave
the publisher actual knowledge of Elmer's wrongdoing,4 0 8 and still
WikiLeaks provided Elmer a microphone and amplifier. The
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

Id. 33-39.
Id. J36, 44-45.
TOBAccO DOCUMENTS, supranote 50.
See id.
See Complaint, supra note 65, % 25-26.

346

The University of Memphis Law Review

Vol. 44

known, underlying breaches of duty leave the defendants little
room to argue propriety.
Both WikiLeaks and CBS might face claims as well for
trade-secret appropriation upon allegations of the defendants' very
own improprieties in acquiring and using confidential information,
besides disclosure-based liability. Here again, as in tortious interference, WikiLeaks' deliberate provision of an "uncensorable" and
"untraceable" avenue for "mass document leaking" is the operative
factual allegation, framing WikiLeaks as an actor in league with
Elmer. 40 9 The allegation against CBS that Bergman offered Wigand indemnity against Brown & Williamson legal action similarly
supports an impropriety theory against CBS. UTSA "preemption"
of common-law and other statutory tort causes of action renders
section 876 liability theories null, but does not necessarily close
the door to these theories of appropriation. WikiLeaks and CBS
need not be in competition with their plaintiffs. As with claims of
tortious interference, any evidence that WikiLeaks capitalized on
the salaciousness of Elmer's leaks or that CBS executives were
manipulating news coverage for commercial advantage fuels at
least a faint argument that the defendant was improperly using confidential information, right alongside the leaker, for purposes of
trade-secret appropriation.
Section 876 liability is broad enough to support this theory
as either civil conspiracy or aiding and abetting, especially after
WikiLeaks acquired actual knowledge of Elmer's breach. Civil
conspiracy liability 4 10 requires that the actor's conduct be tortious
in itself,411 and WikiLeaks may argue that it committed no tort in
furtherance of a common design with Elmer. But common design
may be inferred,4 12 and WikiLeaks' persistence in publication belies its position. The case is a high-tech equivalent to a Restatement illustration:

409.

See id. 1 7, 52, 57.

See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(a) (1979)
(omitting language that would remove the possibility of bringing a misappropriation claim).
411.
Id. § 876 cmts. b-c.
412. Id. § 876 cmt. a.
410.
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A and B are driving automobiles on the public
highway. A attempts to pass B. B speeds up his car
to prevent A from passing. A continues in his attempt and the result is a race for a mile down the
highway, with the two cars abreast and both travelling at dangerous speed. At the end of the mile, A's
car collides with a car driven by C and C suffers
harm. Both A and B are subject to liability to C. 4 13
A's initial act in passing is not a tort, just like WikiLeaks' provision of a web platform is not a tort. However, as A and B compete
for primacy on the road, a common design emerges as to C. WikiLeaks' conduct becomes tortious upon the knowledge that supports the appropriation-by-disclosure theory. Even though Elmer
and WikiLeaks did not consult in advance on their undertaking,
each becomes aware of a common scheme and capitalizes on the
participation of the other, ultimately to the detriment of Baer
Bank. 414
The aiding-and-abetting theory is a better fit and is not dependent on the disclosure theory. Section 876 liability may arise
when one gives "[a]dvice or encouragement to act," even in the
form of "moral support," knowing that the act is tortious. 4 15 WikiLeaks was at best reckless as to the possibility that Elmer would
use its forum to post confidential information, and the Baer Bank
complaint suggested greater culpability. The bank alleged a relationship between Elmer and WikiLeaks pre-dating the release of
the confidential information, involving disclosures of nonconfidential information related to Elmer's dispute with the bank,
including an order from Swiss authorities evidencing Elmer's duty
of confidentiality. 4 16 Therefore, the bank alleged that WikiLeaks
already knew about Elmer's duty of confidentiality when it allowed the posting of confidential information from the same

413. Id § 876 cmt. a, illus. 2.
414.
The allegations of the Baer Bank Complaint can be reduced to a tort
as simply as the prior illustration. C.f Complaint,supra note 65.
415.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 cmt. d (1979).
416.
Complaint, supra note 65, IN 17, 25-26.
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source. 4 17 The allegation pointed to aiding and abetting even in the
absence of an independently tortious act by WikiLeaks.
If in fact Bergman had granted Wigand's request for indemnity against breach of confidence liability, then the liability
theory against CBS would be even cleaner under section 876 aiding-and-abetting joined with breach of confidence. Causation as a
matter of fact would have been debatable prospectively, as Wigand
seemed intent on leaking; however, in hindsight he did not authorize disclosure of his identity absent CBS's denial of his request for
expanded indemnity. CBS may analogize to cases of "legitimate
interest," such as when a bank insisted on its legal position in a
dispute over commission payment. The argument carries more
weight in defense of the CBS indemnity for libel liability because
CBS may argue that its business is the publication of truth, even as
against the chilling effect of threatened lawsuits that lack merit in
the absence of falsity. CBS interests in a libel suit would align
with those of the source upon the common-law plaintiffs maxim
that the talebearer is as responsible as the tale maker. But CBS
would not have been as clearly defending its own legal interests
had it indemnified Wigand for breach of confidence, where the
418
CBS would have
primafacie case against the source was solid.
had to turn to Baron, Lane, and Schulz's plausible but novel theory
that a public-interest purpose may serve as a legitimate interest to
escape associative tort liability for breach of confidence, even if
admitting that the tort in fact resulted from the indemnity incentive. 419
Obviously, the plaintiffs case grows stronger as more evidence is found of a defendant re-publisher's complicity with the
leaker. The difference between associative and direct liability is
again a gauge of attenuation in causation in the Firearm concep-

417. Id. 25.
418. Such a promise raises ethical hackles in journalism. See, e.g., David
Brewer,
Fairness
in
Journalism,
MEDIA
HELPING
MEDIA,
http://www.mediahelpingmedia.org/training-resources/editorial-ethics/239fairness-in-jour (last visited Dec. 13, 2013) (counseling suspicion of indemnity
demands by sources on journalists); see also Smoke in the Eye: Anatomy of a
Decision, supra note 133 (explaining how CBS arrived at indernity agreement
with Wigand and nuanced problems of legal strategy and journalism ethics).
419. See generally Baron, Lane, & Schulz, supra note 165.
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tion. 420 And Baer Bank's allegations against WikiLeaks went further. The bank alleged that WikiLeaks, after learning of Elmer's
breach of duty from bank counsel, "posted misstatements of the
conversation and all of [bank] counsel's contact information and
email address on the website, and at the same time, removed the
contact information for its own counsel,"42 1 and "sought to draw
attention to [the bank documents] elsewhere on the Website to further capitalize on and exploit [WikiLeaks'] conduct to increase the
Website's notoriety and traffic." 422 In trade-secret appropriation,
these facts, if true, would support a claim in multistate law for punitive damages, which the bank sought upon tortious interference,
423
The same
though not upon unfair competition or conversion.
evidence may serve, as Wasson explained, to enhance the case for
bad faith,424 thus impropriety, even though the element in theory,
does not turn on defendant's subjective intentions. That impropriety supports the liability theory for trade-secret appropriation in the
re-publisher's own use of information, disclosure besides, and alternatively augments the case for associative liability for civil conspiracy to breach confidence.
5. Free-Speech Defense to Civil Theft and Related Theories
With respect to these various theories of re-publisher liability-conversion and trespass notwithstanding as likely not viable,
but namely breach of confidence, associative breach of confidence,
and trade-secret appropriation-all predicated on the theft of trade
secrets, the freedom of speech again acts as a wild card. The freespeech card might be worth naught or trump. At the latter extreme,
WikiLeaks and CBS portray themselves bearing the mantle of the
free press. They characterize an injunction as a prior restraint,
prohibited absent extreme conditions and certainly not justified
when merely commercial interests machinate behind a thin veneer
See generally In re Firearms Cases, 24 Cal. Rptr. 3d 659 (Ct. App.
420.
2005). For a more detailed description and analysis of these cases, see supra
Part II.B. 1.
Complaint, supra note 65, 1 29.
421.
422. Id. 37.
423. See id T 7-10 (prayer for relief).
424.

14 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 3D Misappropriationof Trade Secrets

Under the Restatement of Torts § 7 (1991).
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of state action through civil courts.42 5 As against tortious interference, the defendants invoke the rules of Sullivan to negate damages liability in the absence of falsity. 426
At the other extreme, plaintiffs maintain that trade-secret
appropriation and breach of confidence constitute tortious conduct
and communicate no message more deserving of constitutional
protection than a thrown fist in a barroom brawl. Conspiring to
breach confidence or aiding and abetting breach of confidence can
be accomplished through speech, but that speech is no more worthy of constitutional protection than speech that accomplishes bribery, extortion, or the breach of confidence itself. The facts offer a
fair amount of support for this position, in that the conduct by the
re-publisher that is alleged to draw liability in relation to stolen
secrets on some theories is conduct and not speech. The best case
for First Amendment application is on a disclosure-based theory of
trade-secret appropriation. In contrast, conspiring to breach confidence or encouraging breach of confidence by operating an anonymized web forum looks more like driving the getaway car from
the bank robbery than an op-ed critiquing the robbers' technique.
Encouraging breach of confidence by incentivizing a leaker looks
more like bad-faith bribery than good-faith counsel.
Bartnicki and Bunner charted a salient line between the extremes with intermediate scrutiny.4 2 7 Though Cohen was cited
earlier in support of the no-protection-for-newsgathering doctrine,
it can be massaged to yield a position consistent with intermediate
scrutiny.4 28 The Cohen Court described the state doctrine of promissory estoppel as "a law of general applicability" with "no more
than . . . incidental . . . consequence[s]" for the press. 4 2 9 Just like

the decryption controls in Bunner, laws of general applicability
425.
See id. § 5.
426.
See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (providing
that, absent falsity and the knowledge thereof, sufficient safeguards are in
place).
427.
See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 545 (2001) (providing that
content-neutral expression need only be examined under intermediate scrutiny
rather than a more rigorous strict-scrutiny standard); DVD Copy Control Ass'n,
Inc. v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 69, 83 (Cal. 2004) (same).
428.
See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 670 (1991) (noting
that the press is not subject to a stricter level of scrutiny than the general public).
429. Id. at 670, 672.
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with incidental burdens on speech are treated as content-neutral
regulations, furthering the government's asserted interest in constraining conduct rather than speech, and accordingly triggering
intermediate scrutiny. 430 The problem in drawing this conclusion
from Cohen is that the Court further described the consequences
for the press as "constitutionally insignificant," and thus plodded
through no heightened-scrutiny analysis. 43 1 But ten years later,
Bartnicki did subject the application of wiretap laws to a republisher to heightened scrutiny,432 so the approach made sense to
the Bunner court and is defensible here. Eaton-Salners made a fair
argument that the Bunner court erred and strict scrutiny should
have been applied instead; accordingly, the same argument pertains here. 43 3 If that argument is right, it moves the analysis, as in
the Sixth Circuit and Oregon approaches, exemplified in Lane,
almost in alignment with the prior restraint extreme.
With Cohen, Bartnicki, and Bunner as guides, it is impossible to opine definitively on an outcome for a WikiLeaks or CBS
defendant in a trade-secret appropriation or breach-of-confidence
case in which the tort rule is tested by intermediate scrutiny. 4 34
The UTSA and fiduciary-duty laws are both supported by important public policies aligned with intellectual-property protection
and fairness in business, almost certainly satisfying the substantialstate-interest prong of intermediate scrutiny. The crucial question
of narrow tailoring asks whether the laws' protections extend too
far when applied to a mass media re-publisher. Bartnicki made
clear that a defendant crosses the dividing line from protected to
unprotected speech when acting unlawfully. 435 That standard
seems appropriately analogous to the tort line of "impropriety"
when defined as unlawful or otherwise tortious conduct. Section
876-based associative tortious conduct might mark the extreme
430. E.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289-90 (2000) (applying intermediate scrutiny to ban on public nudity).
431.
Cohen, 501 U.S. at 671-72.
432. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 527-28 (noting that intermediate scrutiny
is provided for wiretap analysis).
433. See Eaton-Salners, supra note 392, at 283-89.
434.
Compare Bartnicki, 532 U.S. 514, with Cohen, 501 U.S. 663, and
DVD Copy Control Ass'n, Inc. v. Bunner, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 69 (Cal. 2004).
435. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 524-25 (accepting the petitioner's assumption that the interception was intentional, thereby making it unlawful).
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reach of Bartnicki unlawfulness, though the point is arguable, especially with respect to aiding-and-abetting liability when the conduct is not independently tortious. Surely the standard is stretched
too far if it must reach unlawful conduct, such as surveillance,
which trade-secret appropriation law condemns.
Thus, extrapolating the Bartnicki line, there is room for
WikiLeaks or CBS liability despite the First Amendment defense.
Conspiracy to breach confidence, based on WikiLeaks' road race
with Elmer, can survive intermediate scrutiny. Aiding and abetting
breach of confidence, based on WikiLeaks' provision of a publication forum to a known leaker, or hypothetically on CBS's use of an
indemnity promise to incentivize a would-be leaker, is close to the
Bartnicki line but offers the plaintiff a possibility of overcoming a
free-speech defense.4 3 6 The First Amendment per Bartnicki disallows liability based on a theory of disclosure with mere knowledge
of another's wrong. 437 But evidence that defendants maneuvered
to take their own commercial advantage of the leaked information
might revive the appropriation theory with some vitality against
the free-speech defense. Ultimately, there is a specter of liability
for defendants upon theories arising from civil theft.
6.

Liability Exposure on Civil Theft and Related Theories in
Sum, and the First Amendment in Sum

Though theories of conversion and trespass will not support
liability here, civil theft may be actualized in theories of associative liability for encouraging the leaker's breach of confidence and
of trade-secret appropriation. The associative liability for breach
of confidence again looks to proximity in the relationship between
the defendant and the leaker. Applying the civil logic parallel to
accessory after the fact in criminal law, the media defendant's position is not improved when plaintiff shows that the defendant persisted in republication with full knowledge of the leaker's breach.
And as in tortious interference, a promise to pay the leaker's legal
fees bolsters the coziness of the defendant's relationship with the
436. See id.
437. Id. at 517-18 (reciting facts of case such that defendant broadcaster
"did know-or at least had reason to know-that the interception [of the recording] was unlawful").
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bad actor and thus the case for associative liability in encouragement. Paralleling the logic of criminal responsibility for the accessory after the fact, the media defendant's position is worsened
when the plaintiff can show that the defendant proceeded in the
relationship with full knowledge of the leaker's breach. Meanwhile, the defendant's role in the breach of confidence can serve as
a predicate for liability for trade-secret appropriation. Statutory
appropriation liability arises not only from the acquisition of confidential information, but also from its improper use or subsequent
disclosure. Impropriety in this analysis is flexible, like in tortious
interference, so it may arise from the defendant's knowing encouragement of the leaker's acquisition of trade secrets in breach of
confidence or contract.
In conventional, civil rights era First Amendment thinking,
freedom of speech would bar civil liability upon these theories of
civil theft, as well as unfair competition. But the First Amendment
has never been so expansive, remains largely untested in these
veins, and is no longer the bulwark of the liberal press that it became fifty years ago. The affirmative defense of free speech in
these tort claims is a wild card, to be fair. Precedent may be argued to support the First Amendment as a bar to liability, or as a
nullity. A middle-ground course has been stubbornly pervasive in
the more recent case law. Under this approach, the First Amendment extends in the tort sphere, beyond its established applications
in defamation, false light, and infliction of emotional distress, to
require that liability be tested according to intermediate scrutiny.
If some heightened scrutiny pertains, it might prove to be no more
than duplicative of the various safeguards, namely intentionality
and impropriety, as they already play in the tort theories considered here. Certainly sufficient state interests support these tort
theories that are historically well ingrained in common law. The
question of narrow tailoring might in practice reduce to consideration of the culpability manifested in the defendant's conduct, a
question again of defendant's coziness with the leaker, or bad actor, and the relative purity of defendant's avowed fealty to journalistic norms and ideals. Thus, the First Amendment is not necessarily a bar to liability, and might in fact add little to the analysis.
It makes sense that this civil-liability question in the end reiterates similar questions of facts no matter what the vehicle of
liability. After all, tort law aims to define that which is a civil
wrong, whatever the name it bears. Analyses of civil wrongs aris-
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ing from intentional torts in cases of non-physical harms-in nuisance and emotional distress as prime examples-typically express
as fact-intensive balances, where the ultimate game is proof that
defendant was in the wrong. The contemporary use of intermediate scrutiny, when the First Amendment is applied as against generally applicable laws that do not inherently mean to restrain
speech, is a natural extension of the public-policy sensitive balancing approach, albeit with a classic First Amendment thumb on the
scale to favor the defendant by presumption. Thus, the end-game
is a fact-intensive inquiry into the culpability of the media defendant, viewed in the context of social norms and values such as favoritism for free speech. The more the defendant is able to divorce
its actions from those of the leaker as bad actor-or better, to show
that the leaker is not so bad after all-the less the defendant's liability exposure. Inversely, the less the defendant is able to portray
itself as journalist-editor, standard bearer of professional norms
and ethics that elevate public interest above self and wealth, the
greater the defendant's liability exposure.
III. CONCLUSION
It might be an overstatement to conclude that a successful
tort suit is likely in U.S. courts against a media re-publisher of
leaked corporate secrets. On the hypothetical merits of Brown &
Williamson Co. v. CBS or Baer Bank v. WikiLeaks, the defendants
are likely to prevail. But the fact patterns of those cases allow the
charting of defense vulnerabilities. It is possible, then, to chart a
course to liability on any of the three theories posited heretortious interference, unfair competition, or civil theft-and en
route to overcome even the affirmative defense of free speech.
In interference with contract or prospective economic relations, plaintiffs probably cannot show impropriety, the keystone
element of the torts, while defendants bear a good chance of showing justification, or lack of impropriety, whether in common law or
constitutional law.
However, liability lurks in the shadows for the media defendant that associates too closely with a vulnerable source, or that
allows journalistic ideals to be overwhelmed by a business agenda.
The same pattern of a winning defense on the precipice of forfeit
repeats in unfair competition and civil theft. Civil theft may be
actualized in theories of associative liability for encouraging the
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leaker's breach of confidence, and of trade-secret appropriation.
Close association with a bad actor-here, a leaker-may draw liability for having enriched the media defendant at the plaintiffs
expense.
There are, then, two lessons here for the media defendant:
First, it is not invulnerable to civil prosecution. Complicity in the
underlying unlawful or merely wrongful conduct of a source is a
sliding scale, and greater involvement means greater liability exposure. Second, the professional norms and ethics that emerged in
twentieth-century journalism still matter, and freedom-ofinformation absolutism is an ideal to be pursued at your own risk.
The re-publisher that exercises news judgment and harm minimization in separating content of public concern from the merely salacious will be in better stead in the liability analysis than the absolutist who damns the consequences.
And there is a lesson for plaintiff corporations too. Liability for a media defendant remains a hard row to hoe, and pursuit of
a leaker usually offers little or no consolation or compensation.
Meanwhile, effective injunction in the Internet era remains elusive,
and money is never worth as much as a bottled genie. The best
way to keep a secret is still to keep it secret.

